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Turkey experienced military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980. On the surface they 
appeared similar to coups in other countries. However, Turkey’s experience differed from 
others in that contrary to other cases, in which coups were carried out to bring an end to 
democracy, Turkish military interventions claimed to be “saving democracy.” Moreover, 
while in some countries military governments ruled for long periods and in some others 
successive military interventions occurred, Turkey achieved its transition to democracy in 
a short period of time. This thesis examines three major events—the years between 1950 
and 1960, the 1960 military coup, and the 1961 Constitution—in the history of the 
Turkish Republic in order to define their effects on the civil-military relations in Turkey. 
The thesis argues that a non-democratic action, the military coup, brought about creation 
of Turkey’s most democratic constitution: the 1961 Constitution. Once involved in 
politics, however, the armed forces could not extricate themselves from politics until the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND (1950‒1960): ROAD TO THE MILITARY COUP 
On May 14, 1950, the Democrats succeeded in emerging as the ruling party at the 
Turkish polls in Turkey. The election was a total victory for the Democrat Party (DP). 
The results gave the DP 415 assembly seats out of 487. The Republic was transforming 
into a multiparty system, and the transfer of power was carried out smoothly. The 
supporters of the DP consisted of Turkey’s conservative peasants, a few businessmen, 
and intellectuals who believed in the necessity of a multiparty system.1 The DP had 
promised enough to attract each group’s attention. The promises of higher agricultural 
prices and restoration of some Islamic traditions constituted the basis of rural votes. 
Large and small businesses’ backing was for the easy credits while middle-class voters 
supported the DP for the promise of personal freedom. Therefore, it was a landslide 
victory for the DP.2 The municipal elections of September 3, 1950, were another triumph 
for the Democrats. The party held 560 municipalities out of 600.3 
The new assembly and the new government were substantially different from the 
old ones. After the 1950 general elections, a new elite was in power. The DP 
representatives’ social characteristics were significantly different from those of the 
Republicans. Democrats were on average younger than Republicans and more 
conservative, less likely to have a university degree, and more likely to have a 
background in commerce or in law.4 
  
1Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960‒1961 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 
1963), 7. 
2Kenneth Fidel, “Military Organization and Conspiracy in Turkey,” Studies in Comparative 
International Development 6, no. 2 (February 1971), 19.  
3Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950‒1975 (Colorado: Westview, 1977), 39. 
4Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 221. 
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In its first years, the DP struggled against the actions taken by the Republican 
People’s Party (RPP) until 1950. Civil liberties had been restricted during the single-party 
period—especially during and after World War II. Also, the corruption in government—
during the single-party period—was another problem to deal with.5 
The Democrats felt insecure as long as Ismet Inonu was leader of the RPP. Inonu 
also brought out a sense of inferiority in a way the Democrats could not explain. The real 
reason behind this insecurity was that, although the Democrats held the political power, 
they were uncertain about their hold over the state (the armed forces, bureaucracy, 
universities, judiciary, and press). All these institutions primarily remained loyal to Inonu 
and the RPP. Therefore, the DPP emphasized its dependence on the national will (milli 
irade). 
Under these circumstances, Adnan Menderes started his rule as Prime Minister. 
The ten-year reign of the DP can be summarized as consistently polarizing the country 
and creating bitter inter-party quarrels. The DP, which was initially believed to be the 
advocate of liberties and a new hope for the low-income people, became more and more 
oppressive over time. On the other hand, Ismet Inonu was a shrewd politician; he 
skillfully harassed and provoked the Democrats, causing them to take suppressive 
measures. It was as if the Democrats were the new Republicans. 
1. 1950‒1954 Era: Bitter Inter-party Fights and Measures Taken by DP 
a. The DP and Kemalism 
The first disappointment caused by the government was Prime Minister 
Menderes’s government program, which he addressed to the National Assembly on May 
20, 1950. In his speech, Menderes never uttered the name of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—
the founder of the Turkish Republic.6 In addition to the disappointment, this speech was a 
cause of concern for the officers in the Turkish Arm Forces (TAF), who considered 
themselves as the guardians of the state. Moreover, Menderes was giving an opportunity 
5Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960‒1961, 7. 
6Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, Ihtilalin mantigi ve 27 Mayis ihtilali [The logic behind the coup and the 
coup of 27 May] (Istanbul: Remzi, 1976), 179‒180. 
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to the RPP to manipulate this situation. Shortly after the establishment of the new 
government, rumors of a military coup started to rumble in Ankara. Undoubtedly, the DP 
was anxious about a possible military coup that could be planned by the RPP to take 
power into its hands again by its dominance in the military and bureaucracy. A colonel 
whose name was withheld by the government divulged the so-called military coup; a 
major change occurred in the high positions of the (TAF), and some high-ranking officers 
retired to eliminate dissenting ideas from the Armed Forces.7 
Even today, the name of that colonel is still unknown. It is, however, obvious that 
the DP had no intention of allowing any contradictory voices during its reign. Forced 
retirement and suspension of some officers—without giving them any right to defend 
themselves—signaled the DP’s determination to take any severe measure to strengthen its 
authority. 
The DP’s attacks on basic principles, which were considered unchangeable by the 
RPP in Turkey, emerged as vandalism of Ataturk’s busts and demands for the restoration 
of Islamic practice. “At the Democrat Party provincial congress in Konya, for example, 
some delegates demanded that the right to wear the fez and the veil, and to use the Arabic 
script, all three abolished by the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s, be restored.”8 Although 
the proposals were rejected by the DP, the RPP counterattacked by accusing the 
Democrats of anti-Kemalism. As a result of the Republicans’ pressure, the Ministry of 
the Interior issued a communiqué to all provinces to prevent and investigate events. The 
Republicans also managed to make the Democrats feel embarrassed and caused them to 
step back. The opposition, however, had continued its accusations relentlessly. The 
accusations were generally about the lack of political tranquility and security in the 
country, and the government’s suppressive measures on the society. 
At the very beginning of the DP reign, events showed that the party was in favor 
of a more religious governance of the republic and intended to change the previous 
reforms of Ataturk. It was part of their conservative character. This move might have 
7Davut Dursun, 27 Mayis 1960 darbesi: Hatiralar, gözlemler, dusunceler [The coup of 27 May 1960: 
Memories, observations, and ideas] (Istanbul: Sehir, 2001), 23. 
8Vatan, March 12, 1951, quoted in Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 41, 42. 
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been an attempt to win the appreciation of its religious support base, but the Republicans, 
who always considered themselves as the guardians of the republic and Ataturk’s 
reforms, were determined to be a tough opposition. As a result of the RPP’s campaign of 
vilification, the government felt itself obligated to pass the Ataturk Law, which is still in 
effect, on July 25, 1951. The aim of the law was to protect Ataturk’s statues and his 
reputation. According to the law, those who insult Ataturk would be sentenced from one 
to three years of imprisonment, and those who assault Ataturk’s statues or busts would be 
sentenced for up to five years of imprisonment.9 This law was undoubtedly designed by 
the DP to ingratiate itself with the opposition. 
b. The DP and the Economy 
According to the DP, Ataturk had aimed to establish a Westernized country 
within a capitalist system based on free enterprise. Adnan Menderes’s reforms were also 
based on the same principles. The domestic and the world situation had prevented 
Ataturk from pursuing this economic policy after 1930. Encouraged by the Soviet 
example and Soviet aid, the Kemalist regime decided to intervene actively in the 
economy. But even then, the aim was to create a class of private entrepreneurs capable of 
taking over. When this class was sufficiently developed, the state enterprises would be 
transferred to it and a free market economy established. The Democrats sought to carry 
out the same transformation. 
During its first years in power, the DP delivered the services and improvements, 
which had been pledged before the 1950 election by the party. The new government took 
steps to liberalize the economy, mechanize agriculture, and subsidize the peasants. While 
subsidizing the peasants with money borrowed from foreign governments, especially the 
United States, the DP directed money toward new investments, industry, and construction 
of roads across the country. Private and foreign investments were encouraged 
simultaneously; however, a majority of the investments were carried out by the state. 
Nevertheless, these liberalizing expansions gained the people’s support. 
9Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 41–43. 
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The economic and social developments were an important factor in the political 
arena. Especially the villagers, who were connected to the cities by newly constructed 
roads, were able to sell their harvest in the cities. The surplus of labor, which was the 
outcome of mechanization in agriculture, started migration to the cities. The economic 
growth during early 1950s gained people’s support to the party. In addition, it helped the 
government to hold power for a long time and obstructed the opposition’s criticism. On 
the other hand, this positive atmosphere began to wane after 1955, and the economic 
recession started to be felt in the country.10 
The unions and labor movements constituted some portion of the DP’s votes. 
According to the Democrats, the right to strike was an indispensable part of democracies. 
Menderes, however, procrastinated legalizing the right to strike. He believed that unions 
would never strike and economic growth was more important than unions’ right to 
strike.11 
Feroz Ahmad cleverly clarifies the situation: “Later in the month [September 
1951] the government sent to various ministries for examination the draft of a bill which 
would give unionized labor the right to strike. This bill became the carrot dangled before 
the working class, but it was never passed by the Democrats during their ten years in 
office.”12 Even though the DP achieved economic growth and modernized the country, it 
was obvious that the party, especially Menderes, had no intention of legalizing the right 
to strike. Menderes considered it as a way which could be used against his authority. The 
RPP unexpectedly acted in parallel with the government instead of responding to gain the 
votes of the working class or criticizing the government. The Republicans, like the 
Democrats, believed that the right to strike is not an essential part of democracy. So, the 
DP easily postponed the law, which would give unions the right to strike during its 
governance. 
10Dursun, 27 Mayis darbesi [The coup of 27 May], 24‒25; Zurcher, Turkey, 224‒226. 
11Brian Mello, “Political Process and the Development of Labor Insurgency in Turkey, 1945–80,” 
Social Movement Studies 6, no. 3 (December 2007): 215, doi:10.1080/14742830701666905. 
12Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 43‒44. 
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c. The Democrats and the Republicans 
The decade between 1950 and 1960 can be defined as the decade of inter-party 
strife and the polarization of society. During 1950‒1954, the Democrats had the initiative 
in Parliament. The reasons behind this were the percentage of the votes (53.44)13 they 
received in the election of 1950 and the economic growth during the same period, which 
left no room for the opposition to criticize. The DP’s over reliance on its power in the 
National Assembly prompted the party to suppress any contradictory voice from the 
opposition, the press, universities, and the TAF. 
The attitude of the Democrats to opposition was different from that of the 
Republicans. As the ruling party, the Republicans suffered from a sense of guilt since 
they had never come to power through free and honest elections. The Democrats, 
however, were confident that their first duty was to remove the RPP from power since the 
RPP under Ismet Inonu had become the principal obstacle to progress. 
The DP’s intolerance emerged in different ways. Republicans were attacked by 
DP supporters on October 7, 1952, when Inonu was on a campaign tour. The next day, 
the governor of Balikesir did not permit Inonu to enter the city. In 1953, both parties were 
preparing for the upcoming election (1954). Encouraged by its power, the DP started to 
increase political suppression in the country. On July 23, 1953, the amendments of the 
Universities Law and the Law to Protect the Freedom of Conscience and Assembly were 
passed by the National Assembly. The Universities Law banned university professors 
from participating in political activities. The aim of the Republicans was to protect the 
current political situation, which was in favor of the DP. One of the most concrete 
indications of the DP’s intolerance and attempt to immobilize the opposition was the law 
about confiscation of the RPP’s property and devolvement of the property to the treasury. 
On December 9, 1953, the National Assembly voted to confiscate the majority of 
Republican Party’s property. The DP damaged government-opposition relations by using 
the party’s majority in the Assembly to suppress the opposition. Some lawyers of the 
Ankara Bar and nearly 1,000 students of Istanbul University released a declaration asking 
13 It is the second highest percentage that a party received in general elections during the multi-party 
system. The highest percentage (58.42) was also achieved by the DP in the election of 1954. 
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President Celal Bayar not to sign the law and to support the RPP. This event was 
evidence of the RPP’s power among the students and the intelligentsia. The DP’s 
intolerance was not limited to the RPP. On July 8, 1953, the government closed down the 
Nation Party, which was founded by politicians who had quit the DP and was more 
conservative than the DP. The NP was accused of exploiting Islam for political ends. The 
decision, which was taken by a party that supported a multiparty system and democracy, 
was unacceptable. The RPP unexpectedly started to criticize the government for its 
decision. Actually, the Republicans were believed to support the government, because the 
NP was seeking to undo Ataturk’s reforms. The RPP, however, considered it as a 
restriction of liberties, and used it as a weapon against the government.14 
Undoubtedly, the government-opposition relationship was the most problematic 
field during the ten years between 1950 and 1960. Even today, it is hard to understand the 
tough, unconstitutional measures taken by a party which had the majority of the seats in 
the Assembly. To understand the reasons behind it, the terms “pluralist democracy” and 
“absolute democracy” must be examined. In a short definition, a pluralist democracy does 
not deny the fact that the society must be governed by the majority’s will, and accepts 
minority’s rights. On the other hand, the notion of an absolute democracy argues that 
society must be governed by the majority’s will, and the majority’s decision is above 
all.15 The DP obviously believed in the notion of absolute democracy. Actually, the 
concept of democracy was not well established in the minds of people in Turkey until 
much later. The polarization of the country during 1950s and the violence before the 
1980 military coup displayed the society’s lack of respect for the opposition’s ideas. The 
DP’s intolerance to opposition and its tightened grip on the freedoms of society were 
evidence of this. 
2. 1954‒1957: The Suppression 
In spite of the restrictions in political life, the majority of the population was 
content with their daily life due to the economic prosperity achieved by the government 
14Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 47‒49; Dursun, 27 Mayis Darbesi, 26‒27. 
15Kemal Gozler, Anayasa hukukuna giris [Introduction to constitutional law] (Bursa: Ekin, 2010), 105. 
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between 1950 and 1954. The conservative citizens were especially pleased to see the 
spread of Islamic institutions all over the country. In addition, good harvests due to 
mechanized agriculture, investments, and construction projects were appreciated by the 
public. The RPP’s propaganda arguing the government’s autonomy and lack of security 
in the country was fruitless. Under these circumstances, the DP’s easy victory in the polls 
(May 2, 1954) increased its percentage of votes from 53.9 to 58.42 percent and their 
representation in the Assembly from 415 (1950) to 503. On the other hand, the RPP’s 
representation was reduced from 69 to 31 seats in the Assembly.16 
After 1950, the involvement of the DP in Turkish politics ended the single-party 
system; however, the multiparty system existed only on paper. In reality, the DP had 
enough seats in the Assembly to pass any law—since there was no institution to act as a 
check on the Democrats’ decisions—or to change the constitution itself. So, the system 
was actually a single-party system. In this context, the DP’s repressive government can 
be attributed to an over reliance on the party’s power. The Democrats’ strong belief in the 
notion of absolute democracy is brilliantly expressed in Feroz Ahmad’s words: “The 
view that the majority party received its mandate from the people whom it served led the 
Democrats to conclude that they had the right to monopolize and use for their own 
purposes all the institutions of the state.”17 Also, a lack of respect for minority rights 
caused Menderes to take more severe measures every time the opposition criticized his 
party. 
a. The Dark Cloud over Any Opposition 
After the 1954 general election, the opposition became weaker than ever before. 
Menderes, by contrast, consolidated his position in the party and the country. In early 
1954, the economic problems in the country started to surface. Additionally, in the 
summer of 1954, the harvest was not enough to meet the domestic demand and the 
government had to import wheat from the United States. As the result of four years of 
economic planning, which proved to have been incorrect, rising prices and a spiraling 
16Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 39‒49. 
18 Ibid., 44. 
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inflation emerged. The timing of economic troubles was crucial for the RPP which was 
demoralized after the election results. The RPP had little hope for the future, but the party 
had an issue to criticize the government. On the other hand, Menderes was denying the 
existence of an economic recession and accusing the opposition of portraying the 
situation as a catastrophe. The opposition had to be silenced. Actually, the DP already 
had started to silence the opposition even before the 1954 general election by tightening 
the Press Law. On June 30, 1954, the Electoral Law was amended by the Assembly, and 
some restrictions were applied on the opposition parties. One of the most important 
results of the Electoral Law was the prohibition of opposition parties from using the state 
radio. In addition to the Electoral law, the Assembly, on July 5, 1954, passed a new law 
which went against the very soul of the constitution. This law entitled the government to 
suspend and retire officials, including professors and judges. The law was designed to 
eliminate any opposition idea among the employees of the state and to shape the 
bureaucracy in the hands of government. The law was criticized severely by the 
intellectuals in the country.18 
The intersection of the deteriorating economic situation, the government’s 
repressive measures, and the opposition’s criticism constituted the general framework of 
political life in Turkey after 1954. The downturn of the economy aggravated the 
opposition’s criticism, and the more the government was criticized the more suppressive 
it became. Cornered by the economic problems and the opposition’s constant criticism, 
the government believed in the idea that repressing any contradictory voice would be a 
solution to the problem. However, societies are like balloons, if they are squeezed from 
one side, they swell out on the other side. The DP’s attempts to intimidate any opposition 
in the country created a stronger opposition than before. So, repression was—and still 
is—not a solution. The public, especially the intelligentsia, became more responsive to 
the opposition’s criticism due to measures taken by the DP as well as the economic 
troubles. 
18Nuran Yildiz, “Demokrat Parti iktidarı (1950‒1960) ve basın,” [The Democrat Party rule 
(1950‒1960) and the press], Ankara Universitesi SBF dergisi [Journal of Ankara University Social 
Sciences Faculty] 51, no. 1‒4 (1996): 492, http://acikarsiv.ankara.edu.tr/browse/2701/3498.pdf?show ; 
Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 49‒51. 
 9 
                                                 
A law passed on June 27, 1956, banned the opposition parties from arranging 
public meetings. Smothered by the government, the opposition parties had the right only 
to speak in the Assembly. The opposition thereupon protested at the Assembly sessions. 
The representative of Kirsehir, Osman Bolukbasi, was arrested and convicted under the 
disguise of insulting the Assembly in one of his speeches. In addition to the opposition, 
delegates in the DP were also responsive to the measures taken by the party. The Minister 
of the Exterior, and one of the founders of the party, Fuat Koprulu, first resigned from the 
ministry, and then he resigned from the party.19 
3. The Election of 1957 and the Military Intervention in 1960 
At the beginning of 1957, it was believed that the political turmoil could only be 
resolved by an early election. The pressure from the public and the existence of economic 
problems were forcing the government to hold an election. Finally, on September 4, 
1957, the Democrats announced that the general election would be held on October 27, 
1957. 
In spite of all the problems in the political and public life of Turkey, the DP still 
had a lot of advantages. First of all, by paying a higher price for produce and establishing 
a moratorium on the debts of peasants, the government pleased the rural voters who 
consisted of a majority of the public. Second, the government used the state radio for its 
own propaganda, and was able to reach the whole country. On the other side, the 
opposition was only criticizing and had no solution to the problems of the country. 
Moreover, the RPP had the intelligentsia’s support again, and the opposition parties were 
also not well organized against the government. 
Even though the DP won a majority of the seats in the Assembly, election results 
were the sign of decreasing power of the government. In the new Assembly, the 
Republicans were going to have 424 seats; the RPP held 178 seats; the Republicans 
Nation Party—the successor to the Nation Party after it was closed in January 1954— 
and the Freedom Party had 4 seats for each. Of the popular vote, 47.9 percent was for the 
19Dursun, 27 Mayis darbesi, [The coup of 27 May], 27. 
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DP. The percentage was more than 50 percent in 1950 and 1954. The increasing numbers 
of the opposition in the country gave confidence to the Republicans.20 
Encouraged by the increase of its votes, the RPP started an abrasive and cruel 
opposition campaign. Some opportunities to normalize the government-opposition 
relations were not utilized. For example, Menderes’s survival of a crash at Gatwick on 
February 17, 1959 created a new atmosphere in the relations between the government and 
the opposition. Ismet Inonu greeted Adnan Menderes at the station when Menderes 
returned to Turkey. Menderes’s survival of the crash was attributed to his pious character 
by the people, especially those in the rural areas. Not content with the political 
atmosphere, which was in favor of the DP due to the rumors, the RPP worried about its 
popularity. Therefore, the RPP decided to sharpen its tone as the opposition, and started 
to use military terms in its campaign against the Democrats. Ismet Inonu’s tours were 
referred to as “assaults” or “landings.” The RPP named Inonu’s west Anatolia tour “The 
Great Offensive” (Buyuk Taarruz), and decided to start the tour from Usak, where the 
Greek Chief of General Staff Trikopis was captured in the Independence War. An 
enthusiastic crowd met Inonu in Usak, but his arrival also provoked a counter-
demonstration. Leaving Usak for Izmir, Inonu’s group was attacked by a large unruly 
mob. These incidents strained the relations between the DP and the RPP to breaking 
point.21 
The year 1959 was one of turmoil for democracy in Turkey. It was a year of trial 
and tribulation for the press, which was considered the conscience and guardian of a 
democratic regime. More newspapers were closed down and journalists imprisoned than 
in any other year. The government, however, could do little to check the opposition’s 
activities, except to threaten more repressive measures. But this created the danger of 
escalation, bringing with it the threat of political turmoil and military intervention. 
20Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 56‒57. 
21Dursun, 27 Mayis darbesi [The coup of 27 May], 29‒30. 
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4. Conclusion 
The decade from the election on May 14, 1950 to the military intervention on 
May 27, 1960 can be summarized as a constantly growing polarization between the 
Republicans and Democrats. In addition to economic policy, the role of religion in daily 
life and the maintenance of political freedoms were main issues for Turkey during this 
ten-year period.  
The DP made a good start to its ten-year rule with economic developments. Road 
building and other infrastructure projects went forward at a rapid rate, and more attention 
was paid to agriculture. The economic activities, however, were overextended in relation 
to available resources and resulted in inflation. The salaried class suffered most acutely 
from Menderes’s inflationary economic policy, and therefore slowly withdrew its support 
from the government. The economic situation of the country—especially after 1954—
was one of the main issues which the opposition used against the government. 
The Democrats had been expected to be conservative, and a large part of its votes 
came from conservative rural areas. Although a majority of people were content with the 
acts of the DP for the relaxation of anticlerical pressures, such as the abolishment of the 
1928 law prohibiting the use of the Arabic form of the call to prayer, the RPP began to 
worry about the intention of these acts and the future of secularism in Turkey. Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes’s government program, which he addressed to the National 
Assembly on May 20, 1950 but never uttered Ataturk’s name, was the beginning of these 
worries. At the Democrat Party provincial congress in Konya, some delegates’ demands 
to restore the right to wear the fez and the veil and to use the Arabic script aggravated the 
tensions between the opposition and government. 
The second main issue was that of political freedom. Although the DP had the 
majority of seats in the National Assembly between 1950 and 1960, the Democrats began 
to show a marked sensitivity to criticism. From 1953 on, the government placed severe 
restrictions on the press, the universities, and the opposition by passing a series of laws. 
The culmination of the DP’s measures was the Investigation Committee, which was 
entitled to investigate and prosecute the civil bureaucracy, the judiciary, the armed forces, 
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the police, and the universities. The DP, unfortunately, failed to constitute the balance 
between the majority and minority. The DP believed that society must be governed by the 
majority’s will, and the majority’s decision is above all. The DP’s intolerance to 
opposition and its tightened grip on the freedoms of society were evidence of this. It is 
clear that Adnan Menderes was blinded by the party’s power, which prevented him from 
seeing the end of the road. 
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
Turkey experienced military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980. On the surface they 
appeared similar to coups in other countries. However, Turkey’s experience differed from 
that of others. In contrast to other cases, in which coups were carried out to bring an end 
to democracy, Turkish military interventions claimed to be “saving democracy.” 
Moreover, while in some countries military governments ruled for  long periods—such as 
in Egypt, Libya, and Cuba—and in some others successive military interventions 
occurred, Turkey achieved its transition to democracy in a short period of time. However, 
neither the 1961 Constitution nor the efforts of the Turkish Armed Forces were enough to 
secure stability in the country. Thus, the military could not extricate itself from politics, 
and the resulting instability led to the memorandum of March 12, 1971, which was 
known as coup by memorandum. In this context, to completely understand civil-military 
relations and politics in Turkey after the 1960 military coup, the decade under the DP’s 
rule (1950‒1960), the 1960 military coup itself, and the 1961 Constitution have to be 
examined as a whole. 
Taking these circumstances into consideration, this study will analyze the period 
between 1950 and 1971 and answer a major question: How did the 1950‒1960 era, the 
1960 military coup, and the 1961 Constitution affect democracy and civil-military 
relations in Turkey? 
C. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
There are three reasons why this study is relevant. First, it will provide an 
example of how the coup plotters searched for justification and argued the legality of the 
1960 military coup. The case of Turkey casts a light on how military authorities justify 
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their intervention to democracy and is a good example for developing and 
underdeveloped countries, in particular. The 1960 military coup affected Turkey’s 
political life profoundly, changing the constitutional system that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
founded in 1924 and unseating the democratically elected government. Nevertheless, its 
aim had been to save the state. As George S. Harris claims, “The 1960 coup in Turkey 
grew out of tensions engendered by a widespread belief that the Democrat Party 
government of Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar was about to return to one-party rule by 
abolishing Ataturk’s party led by former President Ismet Inonu. The military move in 
1960 thus represented, in the minds of most of its initiators, a move to save the state.”22 
This began the Republican history of the Turkish Army as the guardian of the state. 
Second, the thesis will provide lessons learned and explore the possible 
consequences of a military coup. It will explain the philosophy of military authorities 
during the process of forming a new constitution. In Turkey’s case, the military power 
chose to codify a democratic constitution that granted rights of individual for the first 
time in Turkish Republic’s history. While Turkey has its unique features, its history sheds 
light on coups more generally making this study relevant to other countries. 
Third, this research can assist policy makers in emerging democracies to 
understand the importance of civil liberties and freedoms for the continuation of 
democracy. Further, the study would benefit those who are interested in learning about 
the challenges that lie with democratic consolidation and civil-military relations—
especially in developing or underdeveloped countries. 
22George S. Harris, “Military Coups and Turkish Democracy, 1960–1980,” Turkish Studies 12, no. 2 
(2011): 203, doi:10.1080/14683849.2011.573181. 
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II. THE JUNTA AND THE CODIFICATION PROCESS OF THE 
1961 CONSTITUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of May 27, 1960, the intervention was declared to Turkish 
citizens by the 7 a.m. broadcast over Ankara Radio. The coup was planned and carried 
out by a group of officers, among which the highest-ranked was colonel. These officers 
assigned Full General Cemal Gursel as the leader of this intervention. Cemal Gursel, who 
was in Izmir then, was brought to Ankara by plane. Early in the of morning of May 27, 
the President Celal Bayar, the Secretary General of the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey (GNAT) Refik Koraltan, Minister of the Interior Namik Gedik, and some other 
deputies from the DP were detained in the Turkish Military Academy. The Prime 
Minister, Adnan Menderes, spent the night of May 26 in Eskisehir. Menderes was 
informed about the intervention on his way to Kutahya in the morning of May 27. 
Menderes was also brought to Ankara by plane.23 
B. THE NATIONAL UNITY COMMITTEE (NUC) 
The first communiqué, announced on May 27 over the state radio, stated: 
Honorable fellow countrymen! Owing to the crisis into which our 
democracy has fallen, in view of the recent sad incidents, and in order to 
avert fratricide, the Turkish Armed Forces have taken over the 
administration of the country. Our armed forces have taken this initiative 
for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation 
into which they have fallen … (and will hold) just and free elections as 
soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party 
administration.”24 
Over the first days of the coup, the road map that the junta would follow was not 
clearly determined. While some these officers intended to hand over the government to 
Ismet Inonu, some of them believed that the government should be chosen by free 
elections after eliminating politicians who had been involved in bribery and corruption. 
23 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 159‒162. 
24 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1993), 126. 
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Meanwhile a third group among these officers was not in favor of handing over the 
government to civilians until constitutional changes were made. Since the highest ranking 
officers were in the third group, the junta agreed on the need for constitutional changes 
first.25 
Forming the NUC was another challenge for the junta. An eight-man team 
unanimously agreed on the members who would form the NUC. Retired Full General 
Cemal Gursel was chosen as the chairman of the committee which was composed of 38 
members. Interestingly, he was also the President, the Prime Minister, Chief of the 
General Staff, and Minister of Defense.26 Even Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (founder of the 
Turkish Republic) had not been invested with so much power when he was the president. 
The reason behind investing all these powers in Cemal Gursel can be explained as the 
junta’s intention to control critical positions and shape future of democracy in Turkey. 
Only 5 of the 38 members—Cemal Gürsel, Fahri Özdilek, Cemal Madanoğlu, İrfan 
Başbuğ, and Sıtkı Ulay—were generals in the committee. The other 33 members were in 
the ranks of army captain, major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel.27 
One day after the coup, on May 28, 1960, an interim government was appointed 
with the NUC’s communiqué 27. Turkish Republic’s twenty-fourth government, which 
consisted of non-political members, remained in the office until January 5, 1961.28 
The powers of the NUC were made public on June 12, 1960. Until the GNAT 
(Grand National Assembly of Turkey) started functioning and the new constitution took 
effect, the NUC would exercise the right of sovereignty and the legislative power. The 
legislative power directly belonged to the NUC; however, the committee would exercise 
the executive power through the Cabinet, which was appointed by the Head of the State 
and approved by the NUC. Ministers would be dismissed by the NUC, but only the Head 
of the State had the right to appoint them. Although the judiciary was kept independent, 
the NUC had the right to approve or veto death sentences. According to the verdicts of 
25 Ibid., 126‒128. 
26 Fidel, “Military Organization and Conspiracy in Turkey,” 19. 
27 William M. Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (New York: Routledge, 1994), 122‒123. 
28 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 165‒166. 
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the Yassiada trials,29 which were announced on September 15, 1961, 15 people were 
sentenced to death. However, the NUC approved only three death sentences: those of 
Adnan Menderes, Fatih Rustu Zorlu, and Hasan Polatkan.30 
C. ELIMINATION OF FOURTEEN MEMBERS OF THE NUC 
Beginning from the junta’s seizure of power, a major disagreement occurred 
among the NUC’s members about which path the council would follow and for how long 
it would remain in the country’s administration. While a moderate group, consisting of 
high-ranking officers in the NUC, advocated handing the administration of the country 
over to civilians as soon as the council amended the constitution, a radical group, 
consisting of lower ranking officers, believed that the council must remain in power at 
least four years until it completed the reforms which had been started by Ataturk.31 An 
additional argument was over to whom the council would hand the government. The 
moderates were apt to hand the government directly to the Republican People’s Party 
while the radicals favored free elections.32 
The disagreement between the moderates and the radicals deepened gradually. 
Officers and 147 professors who were retired by a decree of the NUC were central in the 
dispute between two groups. However, the culminating point of the dispute was the 
enactment of a law that would enable the foundation of a constituent assembly, which 
was going to codify a new constitution. The radicals were against such a law since they 
were in favor of remaining in the administration until the committee should fully 
implement Ataturk’s reforms. Four-fifths of the committee members’ affirmative vote 
was needed to pass the law. Without the radicals’ votes, it was impossible for the 
moderates to form such a majority. On November 13, 1960, the membership of fourteen 
members in the NUC, including Alparslan Turkes, was ended, and a new committee of 
29 In the aftermath of the military intervention, 592 government officials were tried on Yassiada Island 
in the Sea of Marmara. 
30 Ibid., 164, 169. 
31 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk implemented social, economic, educational, and democratic reforms to 
elevate the national life to the highest level of civilization and prosperity. 
32 Fidel, “Military Organization and Conspiracy in Turkey,” 19. 
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23 members was founded by a decree of Cemal Gursel. All fourteen members were 
assigned as ambassadors and attaches to separate countries. Consequently, the committee 
had the opportunity to pass the law.33 
The purge of the fourteen committee members (known as the Fourteen) enabled 
the NUC to found the Constituent Assembly while seriously affecting the armed forces. 
First of all, actions of the NUC were met with dissatisfaction by revolutionist officers in 
the armed forces. Although they were abroad, the Fourteen kept their linkages tight with 
other officers in Turkey. The coup attempts on  February 22, 1962 and  May 21, 1963 
were the results of the Fourteen’s removal. Second, many scholars and officers—
especially junior officers—considered the move as an internal coup. Third, and most 
importantly, ousting of the Fourteen caused cliques in the armed forces and intensely 
politicized it. 
D. THE ARMED FORCES UNION (AFU) 
Needless to say, the stance of the Fourteen threatened the Turkish elites’ (the 
bureaucracy, the press, and the university professors) interests and expectations of 
returning to democracy in a short time. So, the elites greeted their removal with relief. 
However, the military did not respond well to their removal. Especially among junior 
officers, the Fourteen represented “a radicalism created by a lack of faith in the ability of 
the politicians and the established institutions to solve the country’s problems.… One 
consequence of their dismissal was the re-establishment of conspiratorial groups within 
the armed forces.”34 
Considering these groups a threat, senior officers formed the Armed Forces Union 
(AFU) in 1961. The union consisted of officers from all ranks. The purpose was to 
monitor junior officers’ activities and avert any would-be coup attempts. General Cemal 
Tural, the Commander of the First Army and Istanbul’s Martial Law Commander, 
naturally became the head of the union. In the course of time, the AFU and the NUC 
shared the same belief that power must be restored to civilians as soon as possible. 
33 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 165‒167.  
34 Ibid., 168. 
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Considering its support of the NUC, the number of its members, and the power it held 
over Turkey, suddenly made the AFU the real guarantor of the restoration of democracy. 
However, “the final realization that power had shifted from the NUC to the 
military command came only when the Tansel Incident broke over the Committee’s 
head.”35 Two organizations—the NCU and the AFU—with such powers were gradually 
getting closer to a confrontation and that confrontation happened in June 1961. The 
President, Cemal Gursel, appointed Lieutenant-General Irfan Tansel, Commander of the 
Air Force, to Washington as head of the Military Mission. In other words, he was being 
taken from an active post and sent to a more passive post away from Turkey. More 
importantly, Tansel was one of the leaders of the AFU. His appointment heralded what 
would possibly happen to other leaders of the union. As a result, the AFU presented an 
ultimatum and demanded Tansel’s reinstatement. Gursel had to step back and accept the 
ultimatum.36 To what degree the AFU affected the NUC’s decisions while the committee 
remained on the political stage is still unknown and will probably never be answered. 
E. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
The process of forming the Constituent Assembly started with the appointment of 
Professor Turhan Feyzioglu to this duty by President Cemal Gursel. Feyzioglu was a 
Professor at Middle East Technical University then. The law, which identified the 
Constituent Assembly’s structure, responsibilities, and duties, were adopted by the NUC 
on December 13, 1960.37 After the removal of the Fourteen, the foundation of the 
Constituent Assembly in a short time proves the NUC’s endeavor to transition to a 
democratic system as soon as possible. 
  
35 Ibid., 169. 
36 Ibid., 168‒170 and Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 128‒129. 
37 Ergun Ozbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey: 1876 to the Present (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 9. 
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A bicameral Constituent Assembly was established according to first article of the 
law (No. 157). One chamber of the constituent assembly was the NUC itself. Under laws 
No. 157 and No. 158, the second chamber was the House of Representatives, and “was 
composed of the following members: (i) 10 members selected by the Head of the State 
and of the NUC (General Cemal Gursel); (ii) 18 members elected by the NUC; (iii) 
members of the Council of Ministers; (iv) 75 members indirectly elected from provinces 
in which only delegates from each village, neighborhood headmen, and primary school 
headmasters in sub province centers, members of the executive committees of 
professional organizations, and members of the executive committees of political parties 
had the right to vote; (v) representatives of the two existing political parties, the 
Republican People’s Party and the Republican Peasant’s Nation Party; the former was 
given 49, and the latter 25 seats; (vi) 79 members chosen by professional organizations 
and certain associations…”38 
None of the members in these categories were the DP supporters. “To make this 
even more certain, Article 2 of Law No. 157 had excluded from membership in the 
House of Representatives all those who had supported ‘the unconstitutional and anti-
human rights policies by their activities, publications, and behavior until the Revolution 
of 27 May.’”39 
The House of Representatives was composed of 296 members. The majority of 
the members were either the RPP members or its sympathizers. Therefore, the structure 
of the House of Representatives strengthened two beliefs. First, the House of 
Representatives did not have a democratic character. Second, uneven representation was 
regarded as a sign that the NUC would  devolve the administration to the RPP once the 
new constitution was codified.40 
38 Ibid., 10. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Bulent Tanor, Osmanlı-Turk anayasal gelişmeleri: 1789‒1980 [Ottoman-Turkish constitutional 
progress: 1789‒1980] (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayinlari, 2002), 370. 
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F. PROCESS OF CODIFICATION 
A few days after the intervention, the NUC charged a commission, consisting of 
seven law professors of Istanbul University Faculty of Law, with the preparation of a 
constitutional draft in three months. The chairman of the commission, also known as the 
Constitution Commission, was Professor Siddik Sami Onar. The commission completed 
its draft in four and a half months and submitted it to the NUC on October 18, 1960.41 
Composed of a preamble and 191 articles, the draft from Istanbul University was 
long and detailed. Distrust of the general principle of universal suffrage and political 
parties, extension of the powers of the President, and restriction of the powers of the 
executive with oversight by the legislative and the judiciary were the main features of this 
constitutional draft. The draft was criticized, for it was proposing to weaken the executive 
and political parties.42 
Meanwhile, another commission within Ankara University’s Faculty of Political 
Science produced a second constitutional draft. Composed of 109 articles, the draft from 
Ankara University stressed the necessity of oversight of the executive branch through the 
medium of administrative and constitutional judicial branches. In the draft, there were 
also articles proposing independence of the judiciary from the executive and the 
legislative branches. In contrast to the Istanbul University view, Ankara University 
promoted the general principles of universal suffrage, and powers of the executive branch 
and political parties.43 
The laws No. 157 and No. 158, which established a bicameral Constituent 
Assembly (mentioned earlier), were the results of criticisms for the drafts and belief that 
the new constitution must be prepared by a larger group, which had the ability to 
represent whole society.44 
41 Gozler, Turk anayasa hukukuna giris [Introduction to constitutional law], 44‒46. 
42 Tanor, Osmanlı-Turk anayasal gelişmeleri [Ottoman-Turkish constitutional progress], 370‒371. 
43 Ibid., 372. 
44 Ergun Ozbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-
Making in Turkey, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 15, 
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10314021. 
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The Constituent Assembly started to work on January 6, 1961. Correspondingly, 
the House of Representatives established a 20-member constitution commission—also 
known as the Constitution Commission of the Lower House. Members of this 
commission were elected among and by deputies in the House of Representatives. The 
Constitution Commission of the Lower House adopted Istanbul University’s draft as the 
main document and Ankara University’s draft as a secondary document.45 
Between 1950 and 1960, the DP governments’ policies showed an illiberal 
majoritarian character, and the RPP experienced the troubles of that decade in the 
opposition. Therefore, the RPP supported a pluralistic democracy during the preparation 
of the new constitutional draft in the Constituent Assembly. In addition, the RPP 
demanded independence of the judiciary, establishment of a constitutional court, and 
other measures that could balance the power of the executive branch and prevent 
autocracy. 
Since the RPP constituted the majority in the House of Representatives, 
translating these demands into the constitutional draft was not difficult. “Provisions 
concerning the Constitutional Court, a second chamber (Senate of the Republic), 
independence of the judiciary, and more effective guarantees for the fundamental rights 
and liberties were adopted without much debate.”46 
The Constitution Commission of the Lower House completed the draft of a new 
constitution and submitted it to the House of Representatives on March 9, 1961. 
Deliberations in the House of Representatives were contentious. However, the House of 
Representatives was able to reach a final decision, and deliberations in the Constituent 
Assembly began between the two chambers (the NUC and the House of Representatives). 
The Constituent Assembly adopted the draft of the new constitution on the anniversary of 
the coup (May 27, 1961) and decided the draft should be voted on in a constitutional 
referendum on July 9, 1961.47 
45 Gozler, Turk anayasa hukukuna giris, [Introduction to constitutional law], 45. 
46 Özbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey, 11. 
47 Tanor, Osmanlı-Turk anayasal gelişmeleri, [Ottoman-Turkish constitutional progress], 375. 
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G. REFERENDUM 
The referendum on July 9, 1961 was the first referendum in the history of the 
Turkish Republic. During the propaganda period, from May 27, 1961 to July 9, 1961, the 
RPP and the RPNP worked for the ratification of the new constitution. Since the DP had 
been closed and banned from political life, the Justice Party (JP)—successor to the DP—
could make propaganda against the new constitution. On the day of the referendum, of 
12,735,009 registered voters, 10,322,169 attended voting. The 1961 constitution was 
ratified by the votes of 6,348,191 (61.7 percent) registered voters. The percentage by 
which the 1961 Constitution was ratified can be interpreted as lukewarm support for the 
new constitution. There were two reasons why almost 40 percent voted against it. First, 
the society was still suspicious of the military regime. Second, people considered the new 
constitution as a means of returning to single-party system due to the RPP’s majority in 
the House of Representatives during the preparation of the new constitution.48 
  
48 Sina Aksin, Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation 
From 1789 to the Present (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 265. 
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III. THE 1961 CONSTITUTION AND THE TAF’S AUTHORITY 
A. MAIN FEATURES OF THE 1961 CONSTITUTION 
To understand the events that had led to the 1960 military coup, basic features of 
the 1924 Constitution must be examined. The 1924 Constitution had defined the state as a 
Republic for the first time. It had adopted the majoritarian concept of democracy. In this 
concept, sovereignty is defined as the general will of the nation. Under the 1924 
Constitution, powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches were invested in 
the GNAT. So, the GNAT had the power to implement all necessary measures to fulfill 
the constitutional order. This was an unprecedented amount of power for a parliament. 
This system had effectively worked and carried out necessary reforms during Ataturk’s 
presidency. 
The 1961 Constitution had been prepared in an effort to respond to regime 
problems in Turkey before May 27, 1960. Like every other constitution, the 1961 
Constitution had been prepared through conciliation between dominant powers of its 
time. With a simplistic approach, every problem of the multiparty system—especially 
between 1950 and 1960—had been seen as a constitutional problem. Therefore, 
resolution of every political problem had been tried to be solved through the constitution; 
thus, the 1961 Constitution is larger in volume and more detailed than the 1924 
Constitution.49 
Needless to say, the power which the GNAT had possessed under the 1924 
Constitution had provided advantages for the ruling parties. These advantages had 
reached unconstitutional arrangements between 1950 and 1960. This power and the 
structure of the state had been started to be questioned during the DP rule of 1950s. 
Disputes between the DP and the RPP had been generally about fundamental terms of the 
constitution. However, there had been no legal obstacles to stop the ruling party from 
passing unconstitutional or repressive laws. This was the rationale behind why a 
governmental system full of checks and balances was created with the 1961 Constitution. 
49 Gozler, Turk anayasa hukukuna giris, [Introduction to constitutional law], 47‒50. 
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Some of these checks and balances were the Constitutional Court, bicameral legislation, 
presidential veto, and the autonomy of universities, Turkish Television and Radio, and 
the judiciary.50 
In terms of philosophy and purpose, the 1961 Constitution put individuals at the 
center and consolidated society’s and individuals’ rights and freedoms, and supported the 
development of individuals’ rights and freedoms. In other words, the 1961 Constitution 
institutionalized freedoms and democracy, instead of strengthening the authority of the 
state. 
Until the 1961 Constitution was ratified in the constitutional referendum on July 
9, 1961, the 1924 Constitution had been in effect. The very first characteristic of the 1961 
Constitution was that it was completely different from its predecessor. The 1961 
Constitution reorganized government, established the division of powers with checks and 
balances, and introduced new concepts and institutions—such as the Constitutional 
Court, the social state, the pluralist approach, etc.—to Turkish political life. In addition, 
the social rights and freedoms of citizens were being stated and granted in a constitution 
for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic. On the other hand, the 
constitution had been prepared in an atmosphere in which distrust of politicians was 
common. So, the 1961 Constitution created an effective system of checks and balances to 
prevent autocracy.51 
Institutions such as the Constitutional Court, The Supreme Judicial Council, 
Turkish Radio and Television, and the State Planning Organization were intended to 
ensure impartiality and autonomy of some state organs. The principal function of the 
Constitutional Court was to review the constitutionality of legislation. Independence of 
the judiciary was ensured by the Supreme Judicial Council. The constitution provided 
Turkish Radio and Television autonomy to prevent it being used a means of propaganda 
50 Walter F. Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey: From Ataturk to the Present Day (New York: 
Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1981), 221‒222. 
51 Aksin, Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic, 268‒269. 
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for the government’s own ends. Finally, the State Planning Organization brought about a 
systematic approach to investments and economic planning.52 
1. Fundamental Rights and Liberties 
The 1961 Constitution placed a special emphasis on human rights issues. 
Violation of human rights and measures taken by the DP administration to suppress 
opposition necessitated such a legal arrangement. Thus, the 1961 Constitution did not 
merely enumerate basic rights and freedoms, but also detailed their components.53 As an 
example, Article 25 stated: “Printing shops, including their presses and other furniture 
and fixtures shall not be seized, confiscated, or prevented from operation; even though 
the underlying charge may be that they are an accessory to a criminal act.”54 
The 1961 Constitution also protected human rights and freedoms from arbitrary 
violations by stating their essence. The second part of the constitution was entitled 
Fundamental Rights and Duties. Article 11 in this part stated: “The fundamental rights 
and freedoms shall be restricted by law only in conformity with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution. The law shall not infringe upon the essence of any right or liberty not even 
when it is applied for the purpose of upholding public interest, morals and order, social 
justice as well as national security.”55 Article 11 put fundamental rights and freedoms in 
a protective triangle. There are four conclusions that can be drawn from Article 11. First 
of all, the article was outlawing the limitation of a fundamental right or freedom by an 
administrative regulation. Namely, the executive was no longer able to arrange 
administrative regulations for the purpose of limiting freedoms or suppressing opposing 
ideas. Second, the restriction had to conform to the letter and spirit of the constitution. 
The principle function of the Constitutional Court was to review the constitutionality of 
laws, and thereby enforce the conformity mentioned in this article. Third, Article 11 
refers to the “essence” of a right or liberty. The essence of a right or liberty is its 
52 Özbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey, 11. 
53 Ibid., 41. 
54 Sadik Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal, and Kemal H. Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 
Middle East Journal 16, no. 2 (Spring 1962), 216. 
55 Ibid. 
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untouchable and irreducible part. Without its essence, a right or liberty has no meaning, 
or it is unusable. 
Finally, the 1961 Constitution adopted the natural rights doctrine. Under Article 
10, natural rights were granted as: “Every individual is entitled, by virtue of his existence 
as a human being, to fundamental rights and freedoms, which cannot be usurped, 
transferred or relinquished.”56 
Experienced from the decade between 1950 and 1960, the Constituent Assembly 
was determined to leave no loopholes to the executive. As a result, the 1961 Constitution 
was the largest constitution in volume thus far.57 
2. Parliament 
The 1961 Constitution changed only the structure of the GNAT. The principle of 
the supremacy of Parliament was kept as it had been in the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions. 
According to the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions, the GNAT was the supreme power of 
state and had executive powers in addition to legislative powers. The 1961 Constitution 
did not endow Parliament with both legislative and executive powers, but balanced the 
powers of the legislative and the executive. Under the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions, the 
GNAT had a unicameral structure. By contrast, the 1961 Constitution divided the GNAT 
into two parts: the National Assembly and the Senate of the Republic. 
The Senate of the Republic, which was a balancing mechanism to review and 
check the activities of the National Assembly, was established by the 1961 Constitution. 
Between 1950 and 1960, the 1924 Constitution was in effect, and the DP, which had the 
majority of the seats in Parliament, held the authority to enact any law on its own account 
and for its own ends. The Senate of the Republic had consisted of three different groups. 
The first group was composed of 150 members, who were elected by popular vote like all 
the members of the National Assembly. Fifteen members, selected by the President of the 
56 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 216. 
57 Gozler, Turk anayasa hukukuna giris, [Introduction to constitutional law], 47‒48. 
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Republic, constituted the second group. The third group consisted of the former members 
of the NUC and the former Presidents of the Republic.58 
One of the reasons behind the establishment of a bicameral parliament was to 
reflect the will of nation in a more realistic way through both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate of the State, which were composed of different aspects of 
the population. The other reason was to prevent the government from misusing its 
executive and legislative powers on the basis of the majority it had in the Parliament. 
However, the powers of two chambers were not equal. While the National Assembly had 
the power to remove a government through a vote of censure, the Senate did not. 
Secondly, the final word was the National Assembly’s in the making of laws. The two 
chambers had equal rights only in constitutional amendments. On the other hand, the 
Senate was slowing down the law making process, and sometimes it was impossible to 
take simple decisions in the GNAT. Therefore, the Senate was removed from Turkish 
political life with the 1982 Constitution.59 
The 1961 Constitution adopted legislative immunities (Article 79) for the 
deputies. In Article 79, it was stated, “Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
may not be held liable for their votes and statements, for the ideas and opinions which 
they express in the Assembly nor for repeating and disclosing these outside the 
Assembly. No member of the legislative body, who is alleged to have committed an 
offense before or after his election to office may be taken into custody, questioned, held 
in custody nor brought to trial without the decision of the legislative body to which he 
belongs.”60 
The legislative body’s independence can be evaluated according to its compliance 
to certain standards. First, the legislature’s power can be measured by “the distribution of 
party strength.”61 Party discipline has always been strong in Turkey. Consequently, the 
GNAT’s methods of supervision and amendments to proposed bills have generally 
58 Özbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey, 59‒60. 
59 Aksin, Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic, 269. 
60 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 223. 
61 Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey, 223. 
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resulted from biased considerations. Nevertheless, the strong opposition and the 
inquisitive posture of the GNAT have always put governments in a position in which they 
have had to account for their actions. So, it is fair to say that these methods have forced 
governments to explain the legality and credibility of their actions. Second, the 
independence can be evaluated by the legislature’s ability to conduct inquiries, 
researches, and investigations. Beginning with the 1961 Constitution, the capability of the 
legislature was constitutionalized under Articles 88 and 89, and also put into a systematic 
form. Third, introduction of private bills is another way to measure the independence of 
the legislature. In democracies, proposing bills and passing laws are not responsibilities 
that belong to governments. In other words, parliaments’ duties do not only consist of 
accepting or rejecting governments’ bills. On the contrary, legislative bodies or even 
deputies must also prepare and propose bills on behalf of the citizens they represent to 
enhance their countries in different aspects. From 1961 to 1975, 12 to 20 percent of the 
laws, which had passed in the Assembly, had been proposed by deputies of parties other 
than the ruling government. The percentage is high compared to other democratic 
countries.62 
3. The Executive 
Hierarchical control, administrative tutelage, and judicial control are three ways to 
supervise the activities of administrative bodies. Among these ways, judicial control is 
the most powerful and effective one, and the effectiveness of the judicial control depends 
on the rule of law. Under Article 2 of the 1961 Constitution, the Turkish Republic was 
defined as a “state governed by rule of law.”63 Needless to say, this was a positive move 
for democratization of the country. Moreover, the constitution proved and strengthened 
its dedication for the rule of law by Article 114, which stated that “no act or procedure of 
the administration shall be immune from the review of law enforcing courts.”64 
Undoubtedly, the Constituent Assembly had intended to provide legal assurance 
62 Ergun Ozbudun, “Parliament in the Turkish Political System,” Journal of South Asian and Middle 
Eastern Studies II, no. 1 (1978), 63‒68. 
63 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 215. 
64 Ibid., 228. 
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(constitutional guarantee) for the citizens and to prevent governments from violation of 
citizens’ rights and freedoms. Even today, the rule of law is an indispensable term in the 
democracy in Turkey and the lives of Turkish people. Although the term was brought by 
a military regime, it was one of the most important and progressive factors in the 
democratization of the Turkish Republic. 
Traditionally, the executive branch of Turkey consisted of the President of the 
Republic and the Council of Ministers. While the President of the Republic possessed 
substantive powers and was conceived as a symbolic office in the 1924 and 1961 
Constitutions, the 1982 Constitution established a more powerful presidency that had 
legislative, executive, and judiciary prerogatives. 
One of the crucial results that the 1961 Constitution brought about was the 
separation of the Presidency from party politics. According to the Constitution (Article 
95), the President would be elected for seven years from among the members of the 
National Assembly, and his presidency was limited to one term. Moreover, the president 
had to dissociate himself from his party and the president’s membership of the GNAT 
had to be terminated.65 General Cemal Gursel, former head of the NUC, and General 
Cevdet Sunay were the first two presidents under the provisions of the 1961 Constitution. 
General Cevdet Sunay had been chief of the General Staff before his presidency.66 The 
Presidency, according to the 1961 Constitution, was an office with symbolic powers. The 
Cabinet (composed of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers) was the real actor 
in the executive branch and the one that was responsible for the administration and 
foreign policy. Although the Cabinet constituted the main power in the executive branch 
and was responsible for the administration of the country, sometimes—especially during 
the terms of weak governments—the Presidents could come out with their strong 
character or political base and play an active role in politics; Ataturk, Suleyman Demirel, 
and Turgut Ozal did this. 
65 Ibid., 226. 
66 Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey, 225. 
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According to the 1961 Constitution, the administration of the country was not an 
authority; it was a duty. As it can be understood from the meanings of these words, the 
1961 Constitution tried to clarify what the power of the executive branch meant. 
According to the 1961 Constitution, the Turkish Republic was a state governed by the 
rule of law and the executive branch did not have limitless powers no matter what 
percentage of the seats it had in the Parliament. Under the constitutional system of the 
1924 Constitution, the lines between the executive and legislative bodies were blurry, and 
the DP manipulated this for its political ends. So there was not a strong division of 
powers. Thus, the division of powers was consolidated under the 1961 Constitution to 
prevent the executive branch from intervening in the legislature or the judiciary. 
However, the division of power under the 1961 Constitution did not mean equality of 
these powers; rather, the legislature and the judiciary held a slightly superior power over 
the executive branch.67 
Although there were many methods of supervision that the GNAT had over the 
executive branch, the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers had few options for 
overseeing the legislature. These methods were questions, general debates, parliamentary 
investigations, parliamentary inquiries, and interpellation. Among these methods, 
interpellation is the most effective and powerful one. Under Article 89, the legislative had 
a chance to vote a government or a minister out of office by interpellation.68 Conversely, 
only two governments (those of Ismet Inonu in 1965 and Suleyman Demirel in 1969) 
faced a vote of no-confidence while the 1961 Constitution was in effect. Two reasons 
were behind it. One was the single-party majority in Parliament, and the other was strong 
party discipline which made it almost impossible for individual deputies to act on their 
own. The adoption of the budget and the vote of confidence at the time of induction were 
other ways for the legislature to oversee the executive branch. However, the executive 
branch had very few ways to renew elections for the GNAT. According to Article 108, 
the Prime Minister could only request the President of the Republic to renew elections for 
67 Tanor, Osmanli-Turk anayasal gelismeleri [Ottoman-Turkish constitutional progress], 401‒402. 
68 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 224. 
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the National Assembly if the government received a vote of no confidence for the third 
time.69 
Consequently, two major problems emerged from the state’s structure founded by 
the 1961 Constitution. First, it caused a high degree of politicization among members of 
Turkish governments—especially in coalition governments—and most branches of the 
administration. Since the ministers were mostly and proportionally nominated and 
appointed from among members of the GNAT, they worked to appease their party’s 
supporters by using ministerial powers and authorizing projects for the continuation of 
political status. The second problem was excessive “formalism and legalism.”70 As a 
result of the politicization, the ministers tended to delegate little authority to subordinate 
positions. Consequently, high-level civil servants had little space to take independent 
decisions, and the ministers had to handle problems at a tactical level (not at a strategic 
level) and details.71 
4. Local Governments 
In the Ottoman Empire, the provinces had been under the jurisdiction of 
governors. These governors had been directly responsible to the central government in 
Istanbul. The governors had been appointed and their salaries had been sanctioned by the 
central government. The governors’ duty had been to provide stability and maximize the 
income of their provinces. So, there was little decentralization. During Ataturk’s 
presidency, the centralized character of the state had been kept to implement reforms that 
had allowed the development and foundation of modern Turkey. The 1961 Constitution 
attempted to decentralize the local divisions while keeping them within the limits of law, 
which would be proposed, amended, or passed by the central administration. Two 
Articles of the 1961 Constitution displayed both centralizing and decentralizing 
characteristics. Firstly, Article 112 stated: “The organization and functions of the 
69 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 172, and Ozbudun, The Constitutional System of 
Turkey, 66‒68. 
70 Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey, 227. 
71 Clement H. Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1969), 225. 
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administration are based both on the principles of centralization and decentralization.”72 
Secondly, Article 116 stated: “Jurisdiction concerning the acquisition or loss of the status 
of an administrative organ shall be exercised only by courts. The organization and 
incorporation of local administrative into unions, their functions, powers, financial and 
disciplinary matters and their mutual ties and relationships with the central administration 
shall be regulated by law.”73 Article 116 was a guarantee for the local divisions against 
the central administration’s arbitrary acts. 
Experiences during the DP rule between 1950 and 1960 had showed that the 
country had been caught in the middle of a bitter political dispute. Turkish citizens were 
almost divided into two groups (those supporters of the RPP and supporters of the DP). 
Events that took place on October 7, 1952 (RPP buildings were stoned by the DP 
supporters), October 29, 1957 (an anti-government demonstration in Gaziantep was 
dispersed by troops), and April 30, 1959 (an RPP convoy was attacked by a mob and 
Inonu was struck on the head) reflected this polarization. More importantly, the 
polarization was apparent among government officials (officers in the Armed Forces, the 
police, professors, clerks in public services, etc.). So, a government official’s 
membership in political parties was prohibited under Article 119.74 Although the article 
aimed to end political polarization in government offices, especially at lower echelons of 
the administration, it was far from being successful. Events that later caused the 1980 
military coup were proof of this failure. 
In addition to territorial decentralization, functional decentralization was another 
problem that the Constituent Assembly had to address and resolve. Two important 
institutions that had to be rearranged according to democratic norms and principles of 
impartiality were universities and the state radio. The 1961 Constitution classified 
universities and the broadcasting and television administration under the title of 
Autonomous Establishments.75  
72 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 228. 
73 Ibid. 
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75 Ibid., 228‒229. 
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The DP’s first action that met with suspicion among academics was a law (No. 
6185) which the Parliament passed on July 21, 1953. Under the law, joining political 
parties and disseminating political publications and declarations by university professors 
were identified as a reason for expulsion. Approximately one year later, on July 5, 1954, 
the government adopted another law (No. 6435) which entitled the Minister of Education 
to remove academics from office. Although measures taken by the DP during its 
governance were fiercely criticized by some of intellectuals (including professors), the 
first severe confrontation took place on February 1, 1958, when Huseyin Naili Kubali, 
Professor of Constitutional Law at Istanbul University, was suspended due to his 
denouncement of the amendments of December 27, 1957. Kubali defended the 
unconstitutionality of the amendments, which made it almost impossible for the 
opposition to do its job even in the Parliament, before his suspension. It was important 
that his suspension was announced by the Senate of Istanbul University, the day after 
Tevfik Ileri, Minister of Education, denounced Kubali’s explanations.76 
Events explained in the previous paragraph disclosed the necessity for universities 
to have autonomy from the executive power. Under Article 120 of the 1961 Constitution, 
the academic and administrative autonomy of universities was recognized. In the same 
article, it was also stated that “the organs, members of the teaching staff and their 
assistants may not for any reason whatsoever, be removed from their office by authorities 
other than the universities. Members of the teaching staff of universities and their 
assistants may freely engage in research and publication activities…Prohibition to join 
political parties shall not be applicable to the members of the teaching staff of universities 
and their assistants. However, such members of the teaching staff of universities and their 
assistants may not assume executive functions outside the central organizations of 
political parties.”77 The article provided academics and universities immunity against 
political threats from the executive branch, and enabled freedom of thought in 
universities which was crucial for academic development. 
76 Suha Goney, “Universite tarihinde ellili yillar ve 27 Mayis ihtilalinin etkileri,” [“The 1950s in the 
history of universities and the effects of the 27 May coup”], Sosyoloji Dergisi [Sociology Digest] 3,  
no. 23, (2011), 263. 
77 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 229. 
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The other establishment to which the 1961 Constitution gave autonomy was the 
broadcasting and television administration. As explained in the first chapter, the DP had 
considered all state institutions at the service of the government and violated the principle 
of neutrality which these institutions should have followed. The state radio station had 
been manipulated and used as a mean of propaganda by the DP. The broadcasting and 
television administration was founded and given autonomy by law to check impartiality 
of all radio and television broadcasts according to Article 121.78 Undoubtedly, the aim of 
Article 121 was to prevent attempts to politicize the citizens by means of radio or 
television. However, taking all radio and television broadcasts (including private ones) 
under government control to ensure their impartiality was not a democratic solution. 
Lastly, both territorial and functional decentralization of government are 
indispensable in democracy. The territorial decentralization increases citizens’ 
involvement in the administration of a particular region. Functional decentralization is 
crucial, especially in specialized public services, to provide these services with necessary 
professionalism. However, the possibility of politicization, corruption, and manipulation 
has always inhibited the extent of decentralization in Turkey. As a result, Turkey has 
become a highly centralized country. “Most of the functions of province, city, and village 
governments, and the priorities to be given to each function are mandated. Almost all 
their activities,” writes Walter F. Weiker, “are subject to close monitoring and approval 
by the central government.” Weiker adds, “Although local government functions are 
shared in a formal sense by centrally appointed and locally elected officials, primacy is 
generally in the hands of the former.”79  
5. The Judiciary 
Judicial independence is the most fundamental aspect of a democratic system. It is 
fair to say that Turkey has a long history of judicial independence to date. Under the 1876 
Constitution, guarantees that had ensured the independence of courts and court 
proceedings had been adopted. In addition to the guarantees, the Constitution of 1924 had 
78 Ibid. 
79 Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey, 228. 
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included provisions that had enabled freedom of the judges. However, neither the 
Constitution of 1876 nor 1924 had provided sufficient tenure guarantees for the judges. 
As a result, the judges occasionally found themselves dismissed or retired by political 
decisions of the executive authorities. The judicial system designed by the 1961 
Constitution broadened and strengthened constitutional guarantees of judicial 
independence in Turkey.80 
To begin with, to implement the rule of law above all and to prevent any 
interference from the executive or the legislative branches, the 1961 Constitution (Article 
132) prohibited questions, debates, or statements “in legislative bodies in connection with 
the discharge of judicial power concerning a case on trial. The Legislature bodies, 
executive organs, and administration are under obligation to comply with rulings of the 
courts. Such organs and the administration shall in no manner whatsoever alter court 
rulings or delay their execution.”81 Another aim of the article was to keep the courts 
isolated from the political atmosphere in the country. 
Secondly, the tenure of judges was guaranteed under Article 133. According to 
the article, the dismissal and forced retirement of judges were prohibited. The retirement 
age for judges was decided as 65 according to Article 134. Moreover, the judges must 
have had no business relations with private or public sectors to presume their impartiality 
against all. So, judges were prohibited from undertaking “private or public duties other 
than those prescribed by law.”82 A new provision was brought about court proceedings, 
and these proceedings became open to public. The constitution stipulated that only in 
cases of public morality or public security required so, could the court conduct of the 
proceedings in secret.83 
In Turkey, there are three major judicial bodies to solve civil matters. These 
bodies are the Council of State (Danistay), the Court of Cassation (Yargitay), and the 
Constitutional Court. The foundation of the Council of State (Danistay) and the Court of 
80 Özbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey, 97‒98. 
81 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 230. 
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Cassation goes back to Ottoman times. The Constitutional Court was created by the 1961 
Constitution.84 
The Council of State (Danistay), which resolves administrative disputes in 
Turkey, was established in 1868. The main function of the Council of State (Danistay) is 
to review administrative decisions brought before the council by the citizens, politicians, 
prosecutors etc. This judicial system, in which administrative disputes are resolved by an 
administrative court (not by general courts), has been maintained by all three 
constitutions (1924, 1961, and 1982) of the Turkish Republic. Yet the 1961 
Constitution’s emphasize on the liberties, rights, and freedoms of individuals and society 
increased the number of cases referred to the council. Also, the 1961 Constitution 
rendered the council an effective check on would-be administrative arbitrariness.85 
The Court of Cassation was also founded in 1868. However, the roots of the court 
go back to 1837. The court is the last instance to review the decisions and the verdicts 
rendered by courts of law. It is fair to say that the 1961 Constitution did not much change 
the structure or the content of the Court of Cassation (Yargitay). 
The Turkish Constitutional Court was established by the 1961 Constitution to 
review the constitutionality of laws. Undoubtedly, the court was considered as an 
effective check over the arbitrary power of parliamentary majorities. Absence of effective 
checks and balances was the main weakness of the 1924 Constitution. This was a major 
problem in Turkish democracy between 1946 and 1960.86 On September 3, 1950, the DP 
won 408 seats in the Parliament while the RPP, the largest opposition party, had only 69 
seats. Moreover, after the general elections in 1954, the DP increased it representation in 
the Assembly from 408 to 503; representation of the RPP was reduced to 31 seats. The 
RPP could only increase its representation to 178 after the elections of 1957.87 As a 
result, the RPP complained many times about unconstitutional measures taken by the DP 
84 Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey, 226‒227. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Özbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey, 111. 
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governments and the absence of a system to review and prevent arbitrariness of the 
majority. 
Instead of giving the task of reviewing constitutionality of laws to general courts, 
the 1961 Constitution chose to establish a centralized review system, and this system was 
maintained by the Constitution of 1982. However, the general courts had the privilege to 
refer a plea of unconstitutionality of a particular law on a pending trial according to 
Article 151 of the 1961 Constitution, and the Constitutional Court was obliged to render 
its decision within three months beginning from the receipt of the contention. Mainly, the 
authorities that can initiate annulment suits of unconstitutionality were: (i) The president 
of the Republic, (ii) the political parties which have obtained at least 10 percent of the 
total valid ballots cast in the last elections, of the political parties represented in the 
GNAT or their parliamentary groups, (iii) one-sixth of all the members of one legislative 
body, (iv) the Supreme Council of Judges, (v) the Court of Cassation, (vi) the Council of 
State, (vii) the Military Court of Cassation, and (viii) universities.88 As is understood 
from the text of the constitution, the Constituent Assembly had intended to involve every 
possible official and public authority in the fight against unconstitutionality. Also, the 
text proves the severity of the experiences endured in the decade between 1950 and 1960. 
When compared with the 1982 Constitution—which empowered only the President of the 
Republic, parliamentary groups of the government party and main opposition party, or 
one-fifth of the full members of the GNAT to initiate annulment suits of 
unconstitutionality89—the 1961 Constitution had been more cautious than its successor. 
Selection of the judges for the Constitutional Court was also an important issue in 
the attempt to provide impartiality of the court. According to Article 145 of the 1961 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court used to consist of 15 regular and five alternate 
members. The bodies that formerly chose members and the number of members chosen 
by these bodies were: 
88 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 233. 
89 Constitution, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Last modified January 9, 2014, 
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The Court of Cassation (Yargitay): 4 regular and 2 alternate members 
Council of the State (Danistay): 3 regular members and 1 alternate 
member 
The Court of Accounts (Sayistay): 1 regular member 
The National Assembly: 3 regular members and 1 alternate 
member 
Senate of the Republic: 2 regular members and 1 alternate 
member 
The President of the Republic: 2 regular members.90 
Obviously, the Parliament was given a major role in the selection of the members. 
Contrary to the 1982 Constitution, which entitles the President of the Republic to choose 
14 members of the Constitutional Court out of 17 and the GNAT elects only 3 members, 
the 1961 Constitution constituted a mixed body from all branches of government. 
As mentioned before, the main reason for the establishment of the 1961 
Constitution was to prevent problems stemming from the extreme majoritarianism 
experienced between 1946 and 1960. Actually, the concept of this pluralist democracy 
started to prevail in Western Europe after the Second World War as a response to 
despotic regimes. The idea of protecting minorities’ rights and freedoms by an impartial 
constitutional court is one of the best ways to free a constitutional judiciary from the 
pressures of majorities.91 Ran Hirschl’s theory of “hegemonic preservation” presents an 
alternative reasoning for the existence of a constitutional review system. According to 
Hirschl, the review of constitutionality is a way by which political elites protect their 
status. Forming one of the minority groups in a society, political elites do not want to 
give up their interests in a possible future to governance by the majority. Thus, these 
90 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 233. 
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interests are first constitutionalized, and then protected by both a constitutional court and 
the constitution itself.92 
Hirschl’s theory fits the Turkish case to some extent; however, the underlying 
cause for the foundation of the Constitutional Court was to eliminate problems associated 
with a majoritarian democracy. In 1950, the change in political power was actually the 
change of régime in Turkey. After the elections of May 14, 1950, a new elite was in 
power. The DP representatives’ social characteristics were significantly different from 
those of the Republicans. Democrats were on average younger and more conservative 
than Republicans, less likely to have a university degree, and more likely to have a 
background in commerce or in law.93 Domination of military and bureaucratic elites, 
which had been the case since the late nineteenth century, was over. Therefore, the period 
of the DP (1950‒1960) was literally a loss of power and status for the military and 
bureaucratic elites. On the other hand, despite the DP’s success in liberalizing social and 
economic spheres between 1950 and 1952, the measures taken by the DP to suppress the 
opposition, media, and universities—especially after the election of 1954—caused the 
ten-year reign of the DP to end with a military intervention on May 27, 1960. It was the 
date when the once dominant military and bureaucratic elites were restored to their 
supremacy. 
The NUC established the Constituent Assembly which consisted of two 
chambers. One chamber was the NUC itself, and the second chamber was the House of 
Representatives dominated by the RPP due to the law (issued by the NUC and numbered 
157). The Constituent Assembly decided on a pluralist democracy with enough checks 
and balances. Undoubtedly, the most important one of these checks and balances was the 
Constitutional Court. However, the elites secured their position by appointing the former 
Presidents of the Republic, 15 senators elected by the President, and the NUC members 
(ex officio senators for life) in the Senate and by the temporary provisions under the fifth 
part of the 1961 Constitution. Temporary Article 4 stated:  
92 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 
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No penal, financial, or legal responsibility claim may be set forth before 
any judicial authority with respect to the decisions and the acts of the 
National Unity Council and the revolutionary government which have 
exercised legislative and executive power on behalf of the Turkish nation 
from 27 May 1960 until the day of convention of the Constituent 
Assembly on 6 January 1961, nor against the administration, or authorized 
organs, which took decisions acted upon and enforced them accordingly… 
no claim of annulment may be set forth before the Constitutional Court 
regarding these laws (the laws enacted between 27 May 1960 and  
6 January 1961) on the grounds of unconstitutionality be raised as a legal 
objection before courts.94 
According to Hirschl, in the countries he studied (South Africa, Israel, Canada, 
and New Zealand) constitutional courts’ decisions were in parallel with the norms and 
expectations of elites who founded them.95 The same behavior can be observed in 
Turkey—both under the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions. In Turkey, state elites have always 
had a strong belief in Ataturk’s system of thought and followed his path by which 
Ataturk had managed to modernize the country. What makes Turkey’s case different 
from the countries Hirschl studied is that the majority of the population in Turkey has 
shared and embraced Ataturk’s philosophy at heart. Thus, the elites did not hesitate to 
safeguard important assets of Ataturk’s ideology (secularism, Ataturk’s modernizing 
reforms, and the national and territorial integrity of the state) both under the 1961 and 
1982 Constitutions. The Constitutional Court has strongly protected the principles of 
Ataturk beginning from its establishment. Two reasons have been foundational to this 
behavior. First, the Constitutional Court was under the influence of elites. Second, these 
principles were under the guarantee of both the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, and 
reviewing constitutional amendments is also a task of the Constitutional Court. As Ergun 
Ozbudun argues, “The Constitutional Court has consistently closed down Islamist and 
ethnic Kurdish political parties through a rigid interpretation of the Constitution and the 
Law on Political Parties. Thus, it has given absolute priority to protecting the national and 
unitary state and the principle of secularism, the two basic pillars of the Kemalist 
94 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 234. 
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ideology.”96 Zuhtu Arslan, in parallel with Ozbudun, defines the predisposition of the 
Constitutional Court as an “ideology-based” paradigm in contrast to a “rights-based” 
paradigm.97 
Finally, the 1961 Constitution started to be criticized by ruling governments 
especially after the general elections of 1969. Among the critiques, the availability of 
improper exploitation of the fundamental rights and freedom, as they were arranged in 
the Constitution, was most commonly expressed. Second, the bicameral structure of the 
Parliament (composed of the National Assembly and the Senate of the Republic), 
complicated the method of enactment (explained under Article 92), the quorum required 
for the opening of the sessions, and the decisional quorum were obstructing the process 
of enactment. Third, it was stressed that the judiciary’s (the Constitutional Court, the 
Court of Cassation, and Council of the State) power and methods of supervision over the 
executive branch made it almost impossible for governments to act. Fourth, by exploiting 
their autonomous status, universities considered themselves totally independent from the 
state. These critiques brought about new amendments in the Constitution, and the 
Constitution was amended seven times (the first being in 1969 and the last being in 
1974). The most fundamental amendments were added between 1971 and 1973.98 
B. NEW PRIVILEGES OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITY 
1. Legislative Privileges 
The inter-party strife between 1950 and 1960 and the experiences gained from the 
same period directed the Constituent Assembly in a way to create a constitution that 
limited the power of the executive branch and guaranteed the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of individuals. In that sense, the parliamentary regime was endowed in parallel 
with the separation of powers; the efficiency of judicial supervision over administrative 
activities was increased as a result of the principle of the rule of law; a bicameral 
96 Ozbudun, The Constitutional System of Turkey, 124. 
97 Zuhtu Arslan, “Conflicting Paradigms: Political Rights in the Turkish Constitutional Court,” 
Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 11, no. 1 (2002), 9‒25. 
98 Gozler, Turk anayasa hukukuna giris [Introduction to constitutional law], 50‒52. 
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parliament was constituted; and fundamental rights and freedoms were safeguarded by 
the Constitution. 
The Senate of the State, which had not existed under the legislative system of the 
1924 Constitution, was established by the 1961 Constitution. The status of ex officio 
members of the Senate of the Republic must be analyzed firstly to better understand the 
legislative privileges of the armed forces under the 1961 constitution. The status of ex 
officio members was drawn up in Article 70 of the 1961 Constitution. The ex officio 
members consisted of the chairman (Cemal Gursel) and members of the NUC—their 
names were listed under law (No. 157) dated December 13, 1960—and the former 
presidents of the Republic. Each of these two groups’ status as senators was granted 
regardless of age. They were not bounded by election or re-election, in other words, for 
life. The only way for ex officio members to lose their status was if an ex officio member 
would decide to join a political party.99 Compared to other members of both the Senate 
of the Republic and the House of Representatives, ex officio members, who had the right 
to continue their term of office for life, were obviously held privileged by the 
Constitution vis-à-vis civilians in the Parliament. 
Another legislative privilege was the life-long legislative immunity that came 
with their status as senator. This was a major guarantee for military-rooted ex officio 
members (former NUC members) in exchange for the cession of power to civilians. In 
addition, the government did not have the authority to unseat the Senate of the Republic 
from its office under the Constitution. 
The third privilege was the election of 15 members of the Senate by the President 
of the Republic.100 Although the article did not, directly or openly, stipulate a military 
history for the members, it entitled Cemal Gursel (former chairman of the NUC) to 
appoint and give priority to military personnel over civilians. Cevdet Sunay (the fifth 
President of the Republic from 1966 to 1973 and the Chief of General Staff between 
1960 and 1966) and Fahri Koruturk (sixth President of the Republic from 1973 to 1980 
99 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 221‒222. 
100 Ibid. 
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and Commander of the Turkish Navy between 1957 and 1960) had the opportunity to be 
elected President after they were appointed as ex officio senators by Cemal Gursel.101 
2. Executive Privileges 
According to the 1961 Constitution, the President of the Republic shall be elected 
by the GNAT for a term of seven years from among members of the GNAT. The 
president had to be at least 40 years old and have a higher education. Also, the President 
was not eligible for re-election.102 Although the Constitution stipulated no obligation for 
the President to have a military career, all three presidents during 19 years that the 
Constitution was effective were either former Chiefs of General Staff or a Commander of 
the Navy. 
On October 24, 1961, the Cankaya Protocol was signed in a meeting attended by 
the Chief of General Staff, commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the General 
Commander of Gendarmerie, commanders of the First, Second and Third Army, and 
leaders of the political parties in Turkey. They agreed to support Cemal Gursel as the 
elected President of the Republic, not to pass laws—after the general elections—
reinstating officers retired by the NUC, and not to seek amnesty for the Democrats 
sentenced in Yassiada. As agreed, Cemal Gursel was duly elected President by the 
Parliament on October 26, 1961.103 Although there was no stipulation for election of the 
chairman of the NUC as President in the Constitution, the election of Cemal Gursel as the 
President meant that the TAF had the intention of overseeing the transition to democracy 
and implementing the system it had established by the 1961 Constitution. Also, the 
election created a kind of de facto situation, and this tradition continued for the next two 
Presidential elections (Cevdet Sunay in 1966 and Fahri Koruturk in 1973). However, it 
must be emphasized that each of the three Presidential elections (those of Cemal Gursel, 
Cevdet Sunay, Fahri Koruturk) was in compliance with the text of the Constitution. 
101 Nursen Mazici, Turkiye’de askeri darbeler [The military coups in Turkey] (Istanbul: Gur, 1989), 
106‒111. 
102 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 226. 
103 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 179. 
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3. The Chief of General Staff’s Status in the 1961 Constitutional System 
The Ministry of General Staff was founded by law (No. 3) dated May 2, 1920. 
Four years later, the Ministry of General Staff was abolished by law (No. 429) dated 
March 3, 1924, and the General Staff was founded. During his 23-year term in the office, 
Field Marshal Fezvi Cakmak had been legally responsible to the Parliament and to some 
extent the President. After his retirement in 1944, the General Staff was put under the 
authority of the office of Prime Minister. Five years later, in 1949, the General Staff was 
taken under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense.104 
According to the 1961 Constitution, the Chief of General Staff became 
responsible to the Prime Minister. The Chief of General Staff would be nominated by the 
Council of Ministers and appointed by the President of the Republic. The Chief of the 
General Staff was designated as the Commander of the Armed Forces.105 
By appointing the Chief of the General Staff directly responsible to the Prime 
Minister, the 1961 Constitution emphasized and promoted the status of Chief of General 
Staff. Thereby, the Chief of General Staff started to hold an office equal to ministers in 
Turkey. However, the Chief of Staff’s responsibility to the Prime Minister maintained the 
principle of the military’s accountability to civil authority. 
During Turkey’s Independence War (1919‒1922) and under the 1924 
Constitution, the GNAT had the authority to take strategic decisions on behalf of the 
armed forces, and the President was the Commander of the Armed Forces. Also, in times 
of war, the Chief of General Staff had been leading the armed forces. However, the 1961 
Constitution defined the Chief of Staff as Commander of the Armed Forces under all 
circumstances.106 
104 Osman Metin Ozturk, Ordu ve politika [The army and politics] (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 
1993), 136‒137. 
105 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 227. 
106 Mehmet Ali Birand, Emret komutanim [Shirts of steel: An anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces] 
(Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1986), 443. 
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4. Status of the National Security Council (NSC) 
After the Second World War, gathering competent parties of civil and military 
power under a council to solve defense issues became crucial and necessary. Since 
management of civil institutions and military units in times of war is a complicated 
process, councils were established in several countries to coordinate and integrate 
national defense services. In Turkey, for the establishment of such a council, studies were 
started by a draft of the Chief of General Staff in 1944. As a result of these studies and by 
the National Defense Supreme Council law (No. 5399), the National Defense Supreme 
Council was established in 1949.  
After the 1960 coup d’état, the National Security Council was established under 
the 1961 Constitution. Thereby, the National Security Council became a constitutional 
institution. According to the 1961 Constitution, the Council consisted of the President, 
the Prime Minister and the ministers as provided by law, the Chief of General Staff, and 
the representatives of the armed forces. The NSC was presided over by the President and 
in case of his absence by the Prime Minister.107 Needless to say, promoting the status of 
the NSC from an institution established by law to an institution under the guarantee of the 
Constitution proved the dedication of the armed forces to oversee Turkey’s political 
progress and to protect Kemalist values against ideological and political threats. 
However, the constitutional position of the NSC cannot be considered legally as a direct 
intervention in the democracy, since the military regime defined the NSC’s decisions as 
“recommendations” under Article 111. In addition, Article 111 enabled the TAF to report 
its observations about problems concerning Turkey and Turkey’s defense policy to the 
highest political power in Turkey.108 
In conclusion, the 1961 Constitution had been prepared by the Constituent 
Assembly to solve regime problems that Turkey had experienced until the 1960 coup 
d’état. The notion that every regime problem could be ended by constitution resulted in 
Turkey’s second largest constitution in volume (the first being the 1982 Constitution). 
107 Balkan, Uysal, and Karpat, “The Constitution of the Turkish Republic,” 227‒228. 
108 Ibid. 
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Since there had been no legal obstacles to stop the ruling party from enacting 
unconstitutional laws under the 1924 Constitution, the 1961 Constitution created a 
governmental system full of checks and balances. In addition, instead of the integrity of 
the state, the 1961 Constitution put fundamental rights and freedoms first and protected 
individuals and institutions from arbitrary violations of the executive branch. The 1961 
Constitution introduced the Senate of the Republic for the first time in the Turkish 
Republic’s history. The main principle underlying the foundation of the Senate was to 
review and check the activities of the National Assembly. While limiting the executive’s 
authority for the reasons mentioned previously, the Constitution equipped the legislature 
with powers and immunities to position it above the executive branch. The most 
important of these limitations was the principle of the rule of law which was stated in 
almost every article of the Constitution. The article that reflected the supremacy of this 
principle was Article 114 which stated that “no act or procedure of the administration 
shall be immune from the review of law enforcing courts.”109 
Military power in Turkey continued to hold some privileges under the 1961 
Constitution. The life-long status of 15 members elected by the President and the former 
NUC members as senator was one these privileges. Also these ex officio members of the 
Senate benefited from legislative immunities that came with their status as senator. For 
the period that the 1961 Constitution was in effect, two of the Presidents were former 
Chiefs of the General Staff, and the third one was a former Commander of the Navy. 
Instead of being a subdivision of the Ministry of Defense, as in most other democratic 
countries, the office of the Chief of the General Staff became directly responsible to the 
Prime Minister. Originally founded in 1949 under the name of the National Defense 
Supreme Council, the NSC became a constitutional institution. Thereby, the TAF had the 
opportunity to oversee the democratic and political system in Turkey and to convey its 
ideas directly to the President and the Cabinet. Finally, ironically, both the most 
democratic terms and the military power could find themselves a place in the 1961 
Constitution. 
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IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY, 1950‒1971 
In many societies, civil-military relations can be exemplified as social cleavage. 
This comparison does not seem to fit civil-military relations in Turkey, since the Turkish 
Armed Forces established the Republic with civil bureaucrats and helped the 
modernization of the country. Thus, the tide of events especially toward the final years of 
the Ottoman Empire prepared the conditions for the TAF to emerge and to be seen as the 
guardian of the motherland and the Republic.110 Alfred Stepan argues that in Brazil 
military officers—who are generally from the middle class—have always perceived 
themselves as above politics and interest groups, and have not historically belonged to 
any class.111 Similar to Brazilian officers, the TAF has tried to stand an equal distance 
from all divisions of society and to promote only the national interest. 
Professionalism of the Ottoman army was severely damaged when it was 
politicized by the Young Turks. As a result of the politicization, the Balkan Wars turned 
into a tragedy. Being a smart leader, Ataturk easily comprehended what political factions 
in an army could cause, and removed TAF personnel from politics and “direct 
responsibility to government.”112 The TAF adopted Kemalism, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s 
positivist and progressive ideas, as its only ideology for many reasons. He was the 
commander of the Turkish Army during the War of Independence (1919‒1922) and the 
founder of the Turkish Republic (1923). He has been a hero in the hearts of the Turkish 
nation, and especially Turkish officers have carried the responsibility of being “guardians 
of the flame of Kemalism”113 to date. According to Samuel Huntington, the TAF reflects 
the republican and secular state. In his terms, this is a good example of “subjective  
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control of the military” which is the opposite of “objective control” that exists between a 
professional military and a democratically elected government completely separated from 
each other.114 Even so, Ataturk had prevented politicization of the TAF to a large extent. 
During the single-party period (1923‒1946) Kemalism had been the only ideology 
within the state, since the RPP’s program adopted Ataturk’s principles as its only 
roadmap. Transition to a multiparty system brought about a big dilemma for the TAF. As 
a reaction to extremist ideologies of the Second World War, nations conceived of 
democracy as an indispensable part of modernization. In parallel, the TAF supported 
transition to a multiparty system. However, democracy means diversity of ideas, and the 
emergence of new parties brought interests different from those of Kemalism. Moreover, 
although religion became one of the key factors sometimes used for parties’ political 
ends, secularism is one of the pillars of Kemalism. “The officers, confronted with this 
challenge,” Ali Karaosmanoglu argues, “adopted an ambivalent position toward 
democracy. Although they tended to share the view that democratization had become an 
integral element of modernization, they believed that political parties must not divide the 
nation into conflicting groups and must act in conformity with Ataturk’s secular 
principles.”115 In other words, while the military desired to promote democracy in 
Turkey, they avoided being subordinate to civilians to protect secularism and other 
principles of Ataturk. On one hand, the armed forces wanted to stay out of politics. On 
the other hand, they did not hesitate to intervene in politics when it was necessary for the 
sake of the Republic.116 
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A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING MENDERES ERA (MAY 15, 
1950‒-MAY 27, 1960) 
By 1950, the DP of Adnan Menderes swept the general elections and assumed 
power while holding the majority in the Parliament. As mentioned in the Chapter I, the 
TAF’s first disappointment with the DP was the Prime Minister Menderes’s speech, in 
which he explained his government program to the National Assembly on May 20, 1950 
and never uttered the name of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—founder of the Turkish 
Republic.117 The Democrats followed a shrewd policy in relation with the military. While 
they promised to promote the TAF’s position and esteem at the highest level as in the 
past, in private they defended the view that the military had been the biggest handicap to 
Turkey’s development and democratization. The reason behind this was that unlike the 
cadre of the RPP during the War of Independence and later on, the DP had not 
shouldered the burdens of those days or worked in accordance with the military to 
establish and protect the Republic.118 
Until the election of 1954, at which the DP received 57.61 percent of the total 
vote (even more than in the election of 1950), the Democrats maintained their cautious 
and impartial posture on the military. However, the DP’s landslide victory in 1954 
strengthened the Democrats’ self-confidence, and they started to believe that the party’s 
widespread popularity and economic developments were enough to discourage the 
military from taking any action against the government. Meanwhile, the aid received 
from the United States of America under the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s membership 
in NATO in 1952 modernized the TAF in every possible way. Especially the officers in 
technical branches of the military started to be trained in the United States and Germany 
to get required skills. Contact with the West gave these officers an opportunity to 
specialize in their work, observe western democracies, and buy consumer goods that were 
not available in Turkey then, and, for example, save enough money to buy a car. 
However, these opportunities could only impact a limited number of these officers.119 
117 Aydemir, Ihtilalin mantigi [The logic behind the coup], 179‒180. 
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The program instituted by the Democrats at the very beginning of their 
governance was in several ways different from the Kemalist program. Instead of an 
Etatist approach, the DP’s program depended on boosting the private sector and 
loosening import and credit restrictions. Also, the Menderes government borrowed a 
considerable amount of money from the United States of America for the investments in 
Turkey.120 
Between 1950 and 1954, Turkish society was led by “conservative landlords and 
ulema families”121 (learned religious men). However, widespread usage of 
communication (radio and newspapers) and ease of transportation by newly built roads 
increased social mobility and changed the social structure of the country. A new 
bourgeoisie composed of entrepreneurs, professionals, and businessmen rose to affluence 
and went up in their social positions. The social and economic changes in the country 
caused resentment among the old elites of the state. Although these changes did not 
undermine their social prestige, the old elites’ (especially the salaried) economic situation 
started to deteriorate when compared to the new bourgeoisie. The deterioration 
accelerated especially after the inflation of 1953. By 1960, the cost of living in Turkey 
had multiplied to eleven times that of 1950‒1953. 
Naturally, the military personnel were as affected by economic inflation as the 
other salaried governmental officials. On the other hand, prospering groups—
entrepreneurs, landlords, and politicians—continued to amass their capital and hold 
materialist values in contrast to the military’s ascetic idealism. From his interviews with 
officers, Karpat quotes on as saying that “…in the 1950s, some landlords would not even 
bother to show them houses for rent, for ‘they could not afford it’; some store owners 
looked annoyed at the prospect of showing expensive items to this impoverished group; 
waiters with an eye on tips preferred to serve richer customers; and even mothers, who 
had once been highly honored to have officers as sons-in-law, often advised their 
120 Fidel, “Military Organization and Conspiracy in Turkey, 22. 
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daughters not to marry men with ‘shiny uniforms but empty pockets.’ Some officers, 
hard- pressed to support big families, took up such menial jobs as bus driving.”122 
The situation which the officers were in during the 1950s was a result of general 
materialist trends promoted by the DP policies. Downgraded by government policies, the 
military personnel’s morale was very low. Obviously, the DP could not understand the 
TAF’s importance for the state and ignored the fact that the military was an integral part 
of the society. The status of military personnel was undermined in the society. The 
police, on whom the Democrats mostly relied, started to act disrespectfully toward the 
military officers. Regardless of these circumstances, the degraded status of the military 
officers was not the cause that led to the military coup of 1960. 
Kemal Karpat claims that the first secret military organization was established 
after the DP’s landslide victory in the general elections of 1954. Army Captain Dundar 
Seyhan and Orhan Kabibay, Major Sadik Guventurk, and Sadi Kocas were among the 
founders of the organization in November 1954. Majors Talat Aydemir, Sezai Okan, 
Orhan Erkanli, Osman Koksal, and Adnan Belikbas joined the organization in 1956. 
Finally, Sami Kucuk and Alparslan Turkes joined in the years of 1958 and 1959. Among 
these officers, Orhan Kabibay, Sezai Okan, Orhan Erkanli, and Osman Koksal were 
members of the NUC; Orhan Kabibay, Alparslan Turkes, and Orhan Erkanli were among 
the 14 members who were expelled from the NUC on November 13, 1960. This 
organization was founded in Turkish War Academy (Istanbul), and a second organization 
was founded in Ankara. Later on, these two organizations started to act in unison. One of 
the founders of the first organization wanted to name it Iade-i Itibar Cemiyeti (Society for 
Restoration of Respect). When Karpat asked about the motives behind the establishment 
of the organization, this officer answered: 
The prestige of the army was declining. Money seemed to have become 
everything. An officer no longer had status in society. It hurt me to see 
officers forced to take jobs of all kinds and wear civilian clothes and feel 
proud in them.... I was on leave in Izmir with a friend at a restaurant filled 
with well-heeled politicians and businessmen who received adulation and 
respect while we were ignored. I looked at my friend and told him that 
122 Ibid., 1663. 
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things could not go on like this. Corruption and materialism seemed to 
dominate everything. It was not that we needed money, for officers had 
always been ill-paid. But we had had honor and respect in the past. Now 
these were gone.123 
The events that led to the establishment of the military organizations were not 
sufficient to spark and necessitate a military coup. However, the political situation in 
Turkey from 1958 to 1960 had seriously deteriorated. 
The establishment of the Fatherland Front (Vatan Cephesi), an organization 
founded by the DP to counteract the accession of the Freedom Party to the RPP, marked 
the year of 1958. Founded by Adnan Menderes, the Fatherland Front aimed at uniting all 
DP organizations in Turkey. To do so and to intimidate the opposition, the names of the 
DP supporters had been announced constantly by the state radio. The practice was one of 
the events that led to the 1960 military coup. In the mid-1950s, an opposition movement 
started in Turkey. Inonu, who wanted to use this for his party’s ends, started to stage 
mass meetings throughout Anatolia. In addition to massive opposition, the coup d’état 
that took place in Iraq in 1958 discomfited the Democrats. Another clandestine purpose 
of the Fatherland Front was to prevent the Democrats from using the army against the 
government.124  
The year 1959 became infamous with high levels of inflation, prohibition of the 
opposition from holding public meetings, imprisonment of opponent journalists, and 
closure of newspapers. The straw that broke the camel’s back was the Kayseri event and 
the events that followed in April 1960. The train taking Ismet Inonu to Kayseri was 
stopped by government officials, and he was asked to return to Ankara. After a three-hour 
delay, he was permitted to go. Even so, the government started to accuse the opposition 
of instigating the military for a military coup, and Menderes asserted that he had 
documents to prove his claim. The event caused great indignation among the military 
officers, academics, and intelligentsia. On the other hand, the DP decided to set up an 
123 Ibid., 1665. 
124 Hasan Pehlivan, “Ismet Pasa darbeyi istemedi,” Radikal, August 12, 2010, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/dizi/ismet_pasa_darbeyi_istemedi-999776. 
 54 
                                                 
Assembly Committee of Investigation to research the facts behind the activities of the 
opposition.125 
The debate in the Parliament regarding the establishment of the committee was 
tense, but short. Due to the DP’s majority in the Parliament an Assembly Committee of 
Investigation was set up on April 18, 1960, and for the same reason, it was dominated by 
the DP representatives. Moreover, the Committee was given unprecedented powers. In 
the history of Turkey, none of the Parliaments or the courts had been entitled to hold such 
powers. The very first thing that the Committee decided on was to suspend all political 
activities and broadcasting of all debates in the Parliament about the investigation until 
the Committee completed its work. Undoubtedly, both the establishment of such a 
committee and the decisions it took were unconstitutional. Moreover, the power of the 
Committee expanded by a law dated April 27, 1960.126 Under the law, the Committee 
was entitled to “censor the press, to suppress newspapers, to issue subpoenas, and to 
impose sentences of up to three years’ imprisonment on anyone who resisted or 
hampered its work.”127 
Ismet Inonu was suspended for twelve parliamentary sessions on the grounds of 
using words inciting people to revolt during discussions about the law of April 27. The 
Republican youth organizations’ demonstrations (student movements) in Istanbul and 
Ankara followed this decision. Martial law was declared in Istanbul and Ankara. Some of 
the universities were closed down. The government forbade the press to report the events. 
However, the demonstrations did not last long, and Menderes was confident that those 
responsible would be held accountable in front of the courts. By May 3, 1960, the 
demonstrations essentially came to an end, and the situation turned to normal again. 
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The Democrats many times attempted to use the military forces to stop Inonu 
from entering cities or towns, and prevent him from addressing the citizens. However, 
these attempts always backfired. Due to their respect for the old commander, officers and 
soldiers put their weapons down and did not stand on his way. During the demonstrations 
after the enactment of the law dated April 27, 1960, the police treated university students 
brutally. In contrast to the police, the army showed reluctance in arresting students or 
firing on them. The growing rupture between the government and the military, 
intelligentsia, and the press caused the emergence of the coalition known as the Active 
Forces (Zinde Kuvvetler). 
On May 21, 1960, the War College cadets started a demonstration. The 
demonstration was more important than the demonstrations arranged by university 
students, since the cadets were future officers of the Army. Confronting a heavy blow to 
its prestige, the government introduced martial law in Ankara. However, the precautions 
taken by the government alarmed the conspirators of the demonstration and spurred them 
to act before their identities were disclosed. Eventually, the TAF seized power in Turkey 
on May 27, 1960.128 
B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AFTER THE MILITARY COUP OF 
MAY 27 (1961‒1971) 
1. Summary of Events between 1961 and 1971 
The military rule after the 1960 coup d’état lasted only eighteen months, and the 
NUC kept its promise to return the country to a democratic administration as quickly as 
possible. The main reason for this was Ataturk’s efforts and emphasis (during his life) on 
keeping the military and politics separate. In 1924, to carry out their duties 
unconditionally and loyal only to the high values of military service, Ataturk demanded 
the commanders who were also deputies in the Parliament to resign from deputyship.129 
The second reason for the short-lived coup was a lack of accord within the TAF. As 
mentioned in the Chapter II, the disagreement between senior and junior officers of the 
128 Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 13‒15. 
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NUC resulted in the removal of the Fourteens. As mentioned before, while high-ranking 
officers in the NUC advocated handing the administration of the country over to civilians 
as soon as the council prepared the new constitution, low-ranking officers insisted on 
holding power at least four years to complete the reforms which had been started by 
Ataturk. The difference of opinion reflected the situation in the TAF on a small scale. 
Thirdly, the administration was handed over to civilians in a short amount of time 
because the NUC promised to do so in its communiqué on May 27, 1960, and the goals 
declared in the communiqué were limited—codifying a new constitution, restructuring 
important institutions, rewriting election laws for proportional representation in the 
Parliament, and eliminating the Democrats who had been charged with crimes against the 
Republic from politics.130 
During the NUC period (May 27, 1960‒October 15, 1961), Turkey took some 
steps to become a more democratized country. These steps included the 1961 
Constitution, the principle of the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, the 
Constitutional Court, and freedom of the press, etc. Others still loomed large in the 
debates concerning the military rule. One of the most important of these was the 
treatment of former ministers, deputies, military officers, and officials who had supported 
the alleged crimes committed by the DP. The trial of 592 officials began in October 1960 
on the island of Yassiada. At the end of the sessions, which took eleven months, 402 
were convicted, and 133 acquitted. Most importantly, three high-level officials—Adnan 
Menderes, Fatih Rustu Zorlu, and Hasan Polatkan—were sentenced to death and 
executed later.131 
The results of both the constitutional referendum in July 1961 and the general 
election on October 15, 1961 proved the ongoing popularity of the DP in Turkey. In the 
referendum, 38 percent of the population voted against the Constitution. The election 
results reflected the political diversification in the country. The 1961 election resulted in 
a victory for Ismet Inonu. The RPP received 36.7 percent of the votes, which meant 173 
130 Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, “The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey,” Comparative 
Politics 16, no. 1 (October 1983), 17‒33. 
131 Harris, “Military Coups and Turkish Democracy,” 203‒213. 
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seats in the Assembly. The parties that aspired to be the successor to the DP split and 
shared votes of the Democrats. However, the combined votes of these parties showed that 
the public’s support for the Democrats did not last. Percentages and number of seats in 
the Assembly for these parties were: (i) The Justice Party ‒ 34.8 percent of votes, 158 
seats, (ii) the Republican Peasants’ Nationalist Party ‒ 14 percent of votes, 54 seats, and 
(iii) the New Turkey Party – 13.7 percent of votes, 65 seats.132 
From 1961 to 1965, Turkey was governed by three coalitions. All three of these 
coalitions were under the Prime Ministership of Ismet Inonu. Under the NSC, the top 
commanders continued to watch the implementation of the Constitution and transition to 
democracy, commented on public affairs, and refrained from directly interfering 
governmental issues. Moreover, the TAF quelled two coup attempts in 1962 and 1963. 
Putting down two attempts, the TAF proved its dedication to adherence to democratic 
values. Also, the move encouraged the supporters of the DP succession.133 
According to the 1961 Constitution, elections to the National Assembly were 
required to be held every four years under normal circumstances. After the October 15, 
1961 elections, the first general elections were held on October 10, 1965. One of the 
developments in the 1965 election was the Justice Party’s (JP) consolidation of the 
former DP votes. This also meant a severe defeat for the RPP. While the JP received 52.9 
percent of the votes, the RPP could only get 28.7 percent. The second development was 
the emergence of the Turkish Labor Party (TLP) on the political stage. Turkey’s first 
socialist party received approximately 3 percent of the total votes and 14 seats in the 
Assembly.134 In all fairness, the introduction of democratic terms—such as freedom of 
expression and thought—by the NUC largely made the existence of a radical leftist party 
possible. 
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Major economic and social changes took place during the 1960s. Most important 
among these changes was the rapid pace of urbanization which caused the extension of 
slums and increased the unemployment rate, especially in urban areas. Only the migration 
of Turkish workers to Western Europe could diminish the unemployment rate. With the 
expansion of education, an increasing number of the population started to integrate into 
national and international life. The influx of the younger generation into universities and 
the cities made these places hot points of discussion and politics. The leaders of political 
parties had a new type of society to which they needed to appeal.  
The economy was also an issue. During the 1950s, inflation was the biggest 
problem in the economy. However, private entrepreneurs resumed their activity after the 
1961 election. During the 1960s under the guidance of five-year development plans, 
Turkey’s economic growth rate exceeded that of the 1950s. Nevertheless, inflation 
continued to exist, and the balance-of-payment deficits started to become larger.135 
The freedoms and liberties guaranteed by the 1961 Constitution created 
opportunities for new political parties with radical ideas to be established and for the 
splintering of political parties. The TLP was one of them, as explained before. Prior to the 
1965 election, the RPP also began to adopt a more leftist approach, and its position was 
labeled as “left of center.” The originator of this move was Bulent Ecevit, although he 
was not the leader of the RPP. Undoubtedly, the JP, which received 52.9 percent of the 
total votes, benefited from this move tremendously. Also the leftist approach caused 
conservatives in the party to defect, and led to the foundation of the Reliance Party (RP) 
under the leadership of Turan Feyzioglu in 1967. The foundation of the RP weakened the 
opposition. Another defection took place in the JP. The moderate stance of Suleyman 
Demirel (the leader of the JP) on the right-of-center alienated some groups in the party, 
and new parties farther to the right emerged prior to and after the 1969 election. These 
parties were the National Action Party of Alparslan Turkes (a retired colonel and former 
NUC member) in 1969 and the National Order Party of Necmettin Erbakan in 1970. 
Nevertheless, the JP managed to receive 46.53 percent of the total votes, and became the 
135 Ibid., 125‒140. 
 59 
                                                 
ruling party once more after the 1965 election, while the RPP of Ismet Inonu received 
27.36 percent, and constituted the main opposition in Turkey. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the Turkish Republic was approaching its fiftieth 
anniversary. The situation in Turkey at the very beginning of 1970 heralded future 
problems of the decade. At the beginning of the decade, Turkey confronted severe 
inflation, a high level of unemployment, a big deficit in the balance of payments, and 
escalating urban violence between leftist and rightist student groups. As a result, the 
armed forces intervened in Turkish politics via a memorandum—instead of a military 
coup.136 
2. Civil-Military Relations after the 1960 Military Coup 
When the military seized the power on May 27, 1960, it brought the values of 
military service along with it. In addition, it also carried the concept which brought out 
the dominance of the elite. The first communiqué by the NUC stated that the coup was 
not “directed against any special group.”137 Although the NUC gradually amended its 
views to respond to the needs of all interest groups, the Council’s steps to reestablish 
democracy proved that the coup was actually directed against those who benefited 
socially and economically under the DP rule. That is why a large number of Democrats 
and their beneficiaries were arrested shortly after the coup. Approximately 240 land 
owners in Eastern Anatolia were arrested and interned in Sivas, and inquiry committees 
were established to investigate how these landlords had amassed their fortunes. However, 
the resentment that the military felt during those years were replaced with the feeling of 
nationalism and these measures were rescinded.138 
As a reaction to the accumulation of capital in the hands of certain groups and 
materialist trends during the 1950s, the elite started to consider socialism’s profitable 
sides. As a result of these social considerations, the State Planning Organization was 
founded, land reform was implemented, and the trade unions were recognized and 
136 Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey, 10‒17. 
137 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 126. 
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liberated. It is fair to assert that the military was ready to carry out any reform which was 
proposed by certain intellectual groups, since it did not have enough of a professional or 
long-term economic plan. 
From the very beginning, the NUC tried to portray itself as representative of all 
the branches of the TAF. However, the Council could not succeed at it. Besides, the 
Armed Forces Union, which was founded by low-ranking officers, to express these 
officers’ views, emerged as a pressure group on the NUC. On the other hand, the AFU 
desired to prevent the NUC from directing the military for its own purposes. By this time, 
however, the Union grew in size and started to include generals. Even the Chief of 
General Staff became one of the Union’s members and possessed its control. Bringing the 
Union under control, the Chief of General Staff had the opportunity to prevent officers’ 
political activities and demands.139 
Meanwhile, the military was experiencing problems with the number of officers 
in certain ranks, especially generals. The excessive number of generals, who had been 
promoted to their ranks during and after the Turkish War of Independence, set inferior 
officers’ promotions back. Consequently, the TAF decided to rejuvenate the army, and 
nearly 7,000 lower-ranking officers and 235 generals were retired. In addition to the 
military, the mandatory retirement of these officers affected civilian life. First of all, it 
enabled and led the officers and the generals to join political parties. Second, the retired 
personnel established the organization known as the Retired Revolutionary Officers 
(Emekli Inkilap Subaylari), and the organization began to be an influential body over the 
military. Having close friends or relatives in the military, the retired officers utilized it to 
spread their political views in the TAF. Third, the NUC was needed to soothe the 
mandatorily retired personnel’s anger. To put the military personnel’s finances on a 
healthy footing, the salaries of both active and retired officers were raised, which drew 
loud criticism from sympathizers of the banned DP. Also, feeling the necessity to employ 
those personnel to the advantage of the military, the NUC placed many of them in 
government positions. This was also a way to represent the virtues of the TAF in the 
139 Asli Daldal, “The New Middle Class as a Progressive Urban Coalition: the 1960 Coup d’Etat in 
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public sector. The NUC justified this action in the newspaper Ulus on August 12, 1960, 
by announcing:  
The salvation of Turkey and the onward surge of the Turkish state depend 
upon liberating the state administration and public institutions from 
partisan, immoral, lazy hands. We have decided to strengthen these 
institutions by appointing retired generals and officers who have spent a 
lifetime in honor and dignity. A new spirit, a new credo, will come into 
the state organizations and thus the purposes of the May 27 action will 
shortly be materialized.140 
a. Attempt To Nullify the 1961 Election 
The votes of the ousted DP were shared by its successors and the RPP, who were 
favored by the military, received 36.7 percent of the total votes in the election of 1961. 
Even so, a group of officers in the AFU decided to intervene in democracy on behalf of 
the TAF. Other aims of the intervention were to dismiss the NUC, ban political parties, 
and hand the control of the government to the real representatives of the nation. Also, the 
election results were going to be nullified. The main reason behind this decision was that 
the Democrats, who had devastated the democratic system under their rule, possessed 158 
seats in the Assembly and 77 seats in Senate, compared to the RPP’s 173 seats in the 
Assembly and 44 seats in the Senate. Thereby, the RPP remained in the minority when 
the votes of the sympathizers of the ousted DP were combined.141 
Clearly, the most important side of this decision was its unconstitutionality. It was 
an attempt against the public’s verdict. Also, it was clear that there was no justification 
for any intervention since the elections took place according to the new constitution, 
which had been codified under the military’s authority before the election. So, the Chief 
of General Staff, Cevdet Sunay, opposed the decision and averted any action against the 
elections. He argued that any interference with the results of the general elections would 
mean rejection of the measures taken by the NUC even among the military personnel. He 
also argued that the Chairman of the NUC, Cemal Gursel, would be the President of the 
State, and a new government would be established under the Prime Minister Ismet Inonu. 
140 Ulus, August 12, 1960, quoted in Karpat, “The Military and Politics in Turkey,” 1683. 
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Moreover, by signing the Cankaya Protocol on October 24, 1961, civilians and the 
military agreed to support Cemal Gursel to be elected the President of the Republic, and 
the military was going to restore parliamentary democracy.142 Cevdet Sunay managed to 
prevent these groups from engaging in action, but he did not intimidate young officers 
from forming secret organizations. However, these organizations were easily exposed, 
and their leaders were retired.143 
b. Abortive Coups of 1962 
Between 1961 and 1965, Turkey experienced many coalition governments, and 
the first government after the election of 1961 was established by the RPP and the JP 
coalition. After the 1961 election, the question of amnesty for banned Democrats 
centered on civil-military relations in Turkey. Although the leaders of the political parties 
agreed not to seek amnesty for the Democrats sentenced at Yassiada, the JP and the New 
Turkey Party (NTP) started to demand amnesty for the sentenced Democrats and to 
criticize the coup. It was a provocative move for the interventionist factions in the TAF. 
From the very first day of the 1960 military coup, these factions had been carrying the 
thought that the intervention must not have been just a simple coup d’état, which would 
only topple a government and shortly hand the power back to civilians, but it must have 
had a revolutionary character. 
The rumors circulating in the newspapers and statements of politicians created 
instability and caused certain groups in the armed forces to consider a second coup. Two 
sides of the conflict, the revolutionist factions and the JP, were in pursuit of taking some 
kind of revenge. However, Ismet Inonu was the Prime Minister, and he was one of the 
most respected heroes of the War of Independence. So, an intervention would mean 
disrespect to the old soldier and the core values of Turkish military service. 
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Members of the AFU met in Istanbul to discuss how to respond to the existing 
instability which the country was experiencing. The meeting took place approximately 
five months after the election, on February 9, 1962. The members signed a protocol 
declaring that they had decided to carry out an intervention on February 28. The initiative 
before the 1960 military coup had been in the hands of colonels in Ankara, but now it 
was in the hands of generals in Istanbul. However, the Chief of General Staff, Cevdet 
Sunay, and the Air Force refused to support the protocol. Cornered by the threats from 
Istanbul and Ankara, Ismet Inonu also took sides with the Chief of General Staff and the 
Air Force, and the members who signed the protocol were assigned to posts where they 
would not pose a threat. 
On February 22, 1962, the appointments of Colonels Talat Aydemir 
(Commandant of the War College), Ihsan Erkan (Commander of 229th Infantry 
Regiment), Emin Arat, Dundar Seyhan, and Sukru Ilkin started a coup attempt against the 
government. Deployed in the Ankara garrison, the troops, including the War College 
cadets, under the command of these officers and led by Talat Aydemir revolted against 
the government. However, the Chief of General Staff and Ismet Inonu easily suppressed 
this half-hearted attempt with the help of the Air Force and the letter of guarantee given 
by Ismet Inonu to Talat Aydemir for his surrender.144 
Events following the abortive coup were important for Turkey in terms of civil-
military relations. Among these events, the most important one was the enactment of the 
bill which increased the powers of the NSC and entitled it to give consultation on the 
deliberations of the Cabinet and participate in the preparatory discussions. Thereby, the 
military’s involvement in policy making under the NSC, which had been established by 
Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution, became more noticeable. The second event was the 
amnesty bill for the abortive coup plotters. Such an amnesty bill could not be passed 
without the sanction of the JP (the Democrats). However, the JP opposed amnesty for 
Aydemir and his colleagues, since the JP’s demands for the former Democrats were 
repeatedly rejected by the RPP and the military. Therefore, Cevdet Sunay, the Chief of 
144 Taner Demirel, “Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a 
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General Staff, helped Inonu by declaring his support for an amnesty bill for Aydemir and 
his colleges. Consequently, the JP and the NTP agreed to vote for the amnesty, and those 
who were ill amongst the sentenced Democrats were pardoned correspondingly. Talat 
Aydemir and the personnel who carried out the coup attempt were retired.145 
After the February 22 abortive coup and the events that followed, the RPP-JP 
coalition came nearly to an impasse. It was impossible for the Cabinet to work and solve 
the problems of the country, since extremists in the JP were still holding a grudge against 
the Republicans for the execution of Adnan Menderes, the rejection of amnesty for 
convicted Democrats, and the granting of amnesty for Talat Aydemir. Consequently, 
Inonu decided to resign and reestablish a new government leaving the JP outside. He 
once again resorted to the High Command and demanded its support to stimulate political 
parties for a coalition. With the support of the military, the Second Coalition was founded 
under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu. This time, on June 24, 1962, the 
NTP, the Republican Peasant’s Nation Party, and the Independents were partners of the 
RPP. 
“Certain situations make the civil power abnormally dependent on the military 
authorities. Others enhance the military’s popularity,” argues Samuel E. Finer, “while 
correspondingly depressing that of civil authorities. Militaries’ opportunities to intervene 
are maximized if both situations coincide.”146 Then, Finer classifies those certain 
situations into two categories: “(a) Increased civilian dependence on the military” and 
“(b) The effect of the domestic circumstances.”147 In all fairness, Turkey possessed both 
circumstances which increased the opportunity for the military to be effective in the 
politics after the 1960 military coup. The civilians, especially the Republicans as the 
ruling party, were dependent on the military for two things. The first thing was the nearly 
even distribution of the votes in the 1961 elections. Therefore, no party possessed the 
majority in the Parliament, which forced the parties to form coalitions to establish a 
145 Milliyet, April 24, 1962, http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/1962/04/24. 
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government. Coalition means compromise; however, it was nearly impossible to 
convince both the Republicans and the Democrats—parties with long-standing 
conflicts—to follow mainstream policies. Secondly, the enactment of laws, which the 
government needs for dealing with the country’s problems, was too slow and nearly 
impossible without the opposition’s assenting votes in the parliamentary system of the 
1961 Constitution. As in the case of Talat Aydemir’s amnesty bill, the government had to 
ask for the military’s support. 
c. Abortive Coup of 1963 
For the one and a half years that had elapsed since the 1961 election, Turkey was 
stuck in a deadlock. None of the problems that plagued the country had been solved, and 
the amnesty issue for the former Democrats was still the overwhelming problem.  
Meanwhile, the relentless political aspirations of Talat Aydemir and his friends 
and the instability in the country were preparing them to attempt another coup d’état. 
There were two problems waiting for them. The first one was about their political status 
once they seized power in Turkey. The second was how they were going to help their 
friends, who had been purged from the military without retirement rights. At this 
juncture, one of the Fourteens, Orhan Kabibay, was preparing to found a Kemalist party, 
and he asked Aydemir and some of his friends to attend a gathering in Istanbul. At the 
gathering, however, Aydemir and his friends discussed the plans for a second coup 
attempt, and the duties were assigned. Thus, they started to organize in a way to seize 
control over the troops in Ankara. 
Talat Aydemir’s intention was to justify the coup (once it was successful) on the 
grounds that it was a Kemalist movement. According to Aydemir, there was dominance 
of some privileged individuals and groups in Turkey, and Kemalism was absolutely 
against it. Also, the unity and integrity of the country was in danger. He argued that his 
group was acting apart from the public, but in accordance with the will of the public. 
Thus, they were in favor of a temporary democracy of intelligentsia.  
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In March 1963, former President of the Republic and a convicted Democrat in 
Kayseri, Celal Bayar, was conditionally released. His release caused demonstrations 
against the 1960 military coup, and his journey from Kayseri to Ankara was to become a 
journey of triumph. In the same month, Aydemir’s group agreed to carry out the coup on 
a day between March 20 and April 20, 1963. However, the decision was leaked, and the 
police learned the plans. The group abandoned its plan. By this time an unfortunate event 
befell the group. Uninformed by the group, lieutenants at the Turkish Naval Academy in 
Heybeliada started to carry out the revolution on the night of March 31‒April 1. They 
were easily apprehended, and their move was quelled. This event largely affected the 
group’s activities and decisions.148 
Suspicious about the activities of the retired officers from the beginning, Ismet 
Inonu was more cautious after this event. On May 14, he suddenly made a deciphered 
speech in his Assembly Group:  
The situation is most urgent. I repeat: it is most dangerous and critical. 
Anything may happen. Take great care. Keep calm. I am struggling very 
hard and making every effort. At the moment, I am not going to tell you 
anything more. Under the existing conditions, I am trying to do what I 
can.149 
Events and Ismet Inonu’s speech revealed the extent of the interventionist culture 
in the armed forces. As a result of revolutionist groups’ political aspirations, the country 
lived in an atmosphere of impending coup for three years. Moreover, even Ismet Inonu, 
one of the most respected figures in the armed forces and once the commander of the 
Army, had been threatened by the danger of would-be coups. 
On the night of May 20‒21, 1963, Talat Aydemir attempted to carry out a military 
coup for the second time. He started with the capture of the Ankara radio station. His first 
move was successful, but he started to lose his initiative at first light the next day. Jets 
from Murted (Ankara) Air Force Base strafed roads around the Army War College with 
gun fire. Lacking enough support, the rebellion collapsed by dawn. Aydemir went into 
148 Isen, Geliyorum diyen ihtilal [The approaching coup], 77. 
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hiding, but was captured—as were other perpetrators—about noon. On July 5, 1964, he 
was executed.150 
Consequently, parliamentary democracy was restored shortly after the 1960 
military coup, but the military was unable to extricate itself from politics. Moreover, the 
military found itself in an ironic position of having to intervene in democracy in order to 
save it. They had to protect the values brought about by the May 27 coup and the 
multiparty democracy and to make civilians work for these two things. So, the armed 
forces had two duties. First, they had to create a consensus among civilians to embrace 
what the 1960 coup brought about and to enforce it, if those conditions were violated. 
Second, they had to provide the political parties with freedoms, although this might have 
brought out conflict within the system created after the 1960 coup. This contradiction 
continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s and bedeviled politics in Turkey. However, 
suppressing two coup attempts, Ismet Inonu and the military showed their intention to 
perpetuate the democratic system that had been founded by the 1961 Constitution. 
d. The Justice Party and the Military 
On October 10, 1965, consolidating the former DP votes, the JP headed by 
Suleyman Demirel received 52.9 percent of the votes (for 240 seats in the Assembly), 
while the RPP could only get 28.7 percent (the lowest since 1950). However, the system 
of proportional representation enabled the RPP to have 134 representatives in the 
Assembly. Turkey’s first socialist party, the Turkish Labor Party received approximately 
3 percent of the total votes and 14 seats in the Assembly. The years between 1960 and 
1965 (the period of coalitions) had decreased the Turkish voters’ willingness to 
participate in democracy, and this showed itself in the percentage of voters participating 
in the 1965 election. Approximately, 28.7 percent of the registered voters refused to vote 
(the lowest since 1950).151 
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The period of unstable coalitions between 1961 and 1965 ended with the JP 
victory, and it was a relief for the country. Also, the military assented to the victory. The 
AFU did not arrange any meeting about the subject or sign any protocol. One of the 
reasons behind this was the existence of retired officers in the Assembly. Among 36 
former officers who were elected, “16 belonged to the JP, 8 to the RPNP, 7 to the RPP, 
and 5 to the NTP.”152 
After the election, the amnesty issue continued to occupy the Democrats’ agenda. 
This time, they were not intimidated by any military coup. Clearly, 52.9 percent of the 
total votes was a stronghold base for their brevity. The National Unity group (a member 
of the NUC) in the Senate described amnesty for the former Democrats and participants 
of Aydermir’s abortive coups as being against their principles, which had been laid down 
in the preamble of the 1961 Constitution, and accused the Democrats of exhausting the 
legality the JP had acquired at the 1965 election. The response of the JP was very strong: 
“Go on, carry out another coup.”153 Besides the abortive coups of 1962 and 1963, this 
event marked a change in civil-military relations from that of between 1960 and 1965 in 
Turkey. It marked the era of cooperation between the Democrats and the military until 
1971. 
On March 28, 1966, Cevdet Sunay resigned as the Chief of General Staff, and on 
March 14, he was elected the President of the State. In 1961, the JP opposed the 
presidential candidacy of Cemal Gursel (predecessor of Cevdet Sunay as Chief of the 
General Staff). In 1965, however, the party supported Sunay’s election to the office of 
President of the Republic, and this caused rumors about the relations between Cevdet 
Sunay and Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the JP and the then Prime Minister. The 
opposition parties were especially spreading rumors. Although both the JP and Cevdet 
Sunay rejected the rumors, the opposition continued to believe that Demirel took the 
Army in hand, or the Army had become his tool. So, a new conflict started between the 
majority party and the opposition parties about how they were using the military against 
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each other. For the period from 1965 to 1971, this conflict and its consequences 
constituted the core of civil-military relations, and the military found itself engaged in 
politics again. 
One of the sides of this conflict, the military only desired to carry out its duties as 
the guardian of the Republic and democracy under the 1961 Constitution, leaving the 
political arena to civilians and keeping stability in the country. Meanwhile, the economic 
and social status of military personnel improved, and they—especially junior ones—were 
no longer taunted by landlords or waiters. Moreover, some officers were recruited into 
high-level bureaucratic positions and public enterprises. Also, some generals were sent 
abroad as ambassadors. The Army Mutual Assistance Association—known as OYAK—
was founded in 1961 and introduced the military to the business world. Shortly, OYAK 
became one of the biggest conglomerates in the country. Also, OYAK was another 
reason for the military to keep the regime in Turkey stable during the 1960s. 
Turkey confronted ideological polarization during the 1960s. Activities of the 
Worker’s Party of Turkey were being followed carefully by High Command from its 
foundation on February 13, 1961. Another leftist organization, this time with a militant 
approach, was the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker’s Unions. Ideological 
polarization also spread in universities. Guarding the regime in Turkey, the military 
became vigilant about extreme leftist ideologies and started to prevent such ideologies 
from spreading among the military personnel. According to the press, however, these 
ideologies found their way into the armed forces, and leaflets were clandestinely 
circulated by the Committee of Free Officers and National Liberation Committee in 
1966.154 Considering that these events were designed to disturb the unity of the Turkish 
Republic, the Chief of General Staff issued a circular called Methods of Combating 
Communism.155 
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Civil-military relations from 1965 to 1971 can be summarized as the 
government’s offensive against the left and the military’s efforts to maintain stability in 
the country. By May 1966, the struggle between the right and the left became grave for 
the Republic. Under articles 141 and 142 of the penal code, writers, artists, professors, 
and students were persecuted for disseminating communist propaganda. In November 
1966, according to news in the gazette, Milliyet’s, the Chief of General Staff, Cemal 
Tural, ordered the armed forces to be ready for the struggle against activities of separatist 
groups. The order, entitled Struggle against Subversive Movements, was supposed to be 
read to the personnel the first Friday of every month.156 When it was made public, the 
order drew great criticism from the left. However, repressive policies only caused the 
students and workers to spill out into the streets and increased the instability in the 
country. Thus, rumors about a military intervention started to circulate in society. 
The social movements of 1968 made the ideological polarization even worse and 
coupled with the economic crisis, Turkey came to a point where many governmental 
institutions were paralyzed—especially universities by students and factories by workers. 
Meanwhile, the TAF tried not to be affected by ideological offensives and to fulfill its 
legal duties to avert the anarchy in the streets. Nevertheless, the chaos in the political and 
social spheres led the military to issue the memorandum of March 12, 1971, or coup by 
memorandum, which forced the government to resign and take necessary radical steps to 
restore stability again.157 
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V. CONCLUSION: ANATOMY OF THE TURKISH ARMED 
FORCES AND EFFECTS OF THE 1960 MILITARY COUP ON 
DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY 
A. ANATOMY OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES 
1. Turkish Army until the Establishment of Turkish Republic 
Having migrated from the Central Asia, ancestors of today’s Turkish people had 
had a combatant character. For centuries, Turks in Central Asia had fought against 
external and internal foes. When they adopted Islam in approximately 751 at the Battle of 
Talas, they were introduced to Islamic culture and this changed the role of the military in 
the society. First of all, Islam had been disseminated through the Middle East, Asia, 
Africa, and even Spain by the conquests. Secondly, it has been declared in the Koran that 
those who died or were martyred in defense of the religion would become şehid and be 
blessed with eternal paradise. That is why the Turkish people have fought willingly and 
diligently in the armed forces to become şehid through history and military service. It is 
for this reason soldiers are willing to leave behind all the comforts of earthly life and 
have gained a prominent place in the hearts of the society. It is important to note that 
commanders in Turkic states constituted one of the highest-level intellectual groups 
throughout history and possessed high-level bureaucratic positions—especially during the 
past two centuries. 
The Turkish War of Independence promoted the society’s respect for its armed 
forces. World War I was a total catastrophe for Turkey and the Ottoman Empire was 
about to be territorially dismembered. At this juncture, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who was 
a general then, decided to shoulder the responsibility of organizing the society for a war 
of independence and taking the necessary steps for establishing the modern Turkish 
Republic. Thus, the military played a key role in the establishment of Turkish Republic, 
as it had been in the case of Ottoman Empire. Naturally, Mustafa Kemal became a 
military and political leader. His charisma and his success in the War of Independence 
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emphasized the importance of the army for the society and consolidated the bureaucratic 
positions of high-ranking officers, especially of the generals.158 
On the other hand, Turkish generals’ involvement in politics reached a very high 
level when the war was over. Many deputies in the GNAT and ministers were high-
ranking soldiers. As mentioned before, law No. 385 was passed in December 1923 to 
extricate the soldiers from politics. The law decreed that military personnel were obliged 
to resign to be elected as deputies. In 1924, the deputies were prohibited from holding 
any other governmental post, including a position in the armed forces, for the duration of 
their deputyship. However, many commanders chose politics and the Turkish military’s 
involvement in politics continued. Consolidating the efforts to keep military personnel 
out of politics, the Military Penal Code, which was enacted in 1930, banned any political 
activity of members of the armed forces and provided for imprisonment of those found 
guilty for up to five years.159 
2. The Army from 1923 to 1950 
Clearly, any kind of military intervention was out of question during the single-
party period. There were two main reasons behind this. First, any coup attempt against 
the RPP would actually be considered as an attempt to topple Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, 
since he was the founder of the RPP and determined the party’s principles. Second was 
the Chief of General Staff, Fevzi Cakmak, himself. He served as the Chief of General 
Staff for 22 years from 1921 to 1944, which is extraordinary or abnormal in a democratic 
country. He was extremely loyal to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, so the armed forces were no 
threat to the regime. 
The armed forces played an important role in modernization of the country. The 
armed forces helped in many ways. First, the military barracks were used as a school. All 
male citizens were required to perform military service, and in addition to military 
training, they were taught punctuality, neatness, modern methods of agriculture, reading 
158 Tachau and Heper, “State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey,” 17‒33. 
159 William Hale, “The Turkish Republic and Its Army, 1923–1960,” Turkish Studies 12, no. 2 (2011), 
194‒195. 
 74 
                                                 
and writing, citizenship, etc., when the soldiers finished their military service, they took 
their knowledge and education to the villages from which they had come. Second, 
military colleges offered free education for young men from all walks of life. Especially 
for those coming from low-income families, these colleges provided modern education, 
prestige, and social mobility. Educated by prominent scholars of the day, the officers 
helped modernization efforts by visiting villages and passing what they had learned on to 
the people. Thus, the officer corps became guardians not just of territorial boundaries, but 
also of Kemalism, secularism, and nationalism. Also, the Armed Forces Internal Service 
Law of 1935 entitled the armed forces legally to the Turkish homeland and the Republic 
of Turkey, which had a broad meaning and by which perpetrators of the 1961 military 
coup justified their action. 
During World War II, Turkey confronted many problems. In addition to famine 
and economic burdens, the country was in danger of being invaded either by Germany or 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). For the first time since the War of 
Independence, the armed forces’ primary duty was to defend the homeland against a 
possible attack. Had President Ismet Inonu’s policy not been successful, Turkey would 
have been one of the sides of a full-scope conventional war. Meanwhile, Turkey realized 
its weaknesses from a military perspective. After the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic, Turkey gave its priority to education, modernization, agriculture, economic 
growth, and promotion of the welfare of its citizens. Thus, expenditure for defense issues 
had dropped. The result was a shortage of modern tanks, anti-aircraft systems, artillery, 
and motorized units in comparison to some other European countries, such as Germany, 
the USSR, Italy, France, England, etc. Also, the number of warplanes was much lower 
than in the threatening countries. In the light of such an experience, two things happened. 
First, Turkey increased the share of defense expenditures in its budget. Second, it was 
once more understood that a strong armed forces had to be maintained to live peacefully 
at this geostrategic place.160 
160 Ibid., 195‒197. 
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In conclusion, military service and the military have become increasingly 
important through history. Moreover, soldiery and barracks gained a sacred status in the 
hearts of the Anatolian people after the adoption of Islam. In parallel, the Turkish military 
became more and more involved in politics—especially during the late period of the 
Ottoman Empire and early years after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. 
B. EFFECTS OF THE 1960 MILITARY COUP ON DEMOCRACY AND 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY 
To begin with, Turkey experienced military interventions in 1960, 1971 (the coup 
by memorandum), and 1980. One of the reasons that makes the 1960 military coup more 
important than others is its being the first truly military rule that the country experienced. 
For the first time in its history, the Republic of Turkey was governed by a military 
committee (the NUC) for about eighteen months. Another reason is its effects on the 
1961 Constitution, democracy, and civil-military relations. Taking place as reaction to the 
DP’s authoritarian practices, the coup brought about the codification of Turkey’s most 
democratic constitution. On the other hand, the junta secured itself against possible 
litigations in the future, enabled the military to convey its thoughts and comments on 
defense issues to the government—anything that threatens the Republic according to the 
TAF—and provide itself executive and legislative privileges under the 1961 Constitution. 
The third reason is the way the coup put the military in an inextricable position from 
politics. Although the NUC introduced democratic terms, it could not stabilize the 
country; the army’s attempts to intervene in politics continued, and military coups took 
place in 1971 and 1980. 
It has been mentioned that both the 1960 military coup and the 1961 Constitution 
were reactions to the DP’s repressive policies. The word reaction is important in this 
sense because it exactly reflects the true nature of these developments. As it can be 
understood from the meaning of the word reaction, these three events were triggered one 
after the other when considered chronologically. Thus, this thesis argues that these three 
events have to be analyzed as a whole to better understand civil-military relations in 
Turkey—especially from 1960 to 1980. 
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The 1961 intervention is known as colonel’s coup. It was not plotted or directed 
by the Chief of General Staff or any other high-level military positions, nor was it carried 
out according to chain of command. It was a coup by some middle-ranking officers with 
political aspirations. Since few of them had a detailed idea of what to do once they seized 
the power, there appeared disagreement among these officers (members of the NUC). 
Two main groups emerged in this disagreement. While the moderate group, which 
consisted of senior officers, believed in returning the governance of the country to 
civilians after installing institutional amendments, the radical groups, which consisted of 
junior officers, argued to hold power until necessary reform was made—at least four or 
five years. In the end, the first group prevailed and the disagreement ended with the 
removal of the Fourteen from the NUC. 
It can be fairly asserted that the 1960‒1961 military rule was not a repressive 
military dictatorship. Although the former prime minister and two former ministers were 
executed in 1961, no violence took place against civilians during the eighteen months of 
military rule. Also, the Democrats showed nearly no resistance to the military rule. In 
addition, the TAF showed its resolution and faith in democracy by installing a democratic 
constitution and keeping its promise to hand the power back to civilians as soon as 
possible. 
The 1961 Constitution had two sides. On the first side, there were safeguarded 
fundamental rights and freedoms, the rule of law, judicial independence, the freedom of 
the judges, the supremacy of the constitution to all other legal arrangements, the 
executive body’s responsibility for all of its actions, and effective checks and balances. 
The ousting of the Fourteen and the 1961 Constitution showed that the military had no 
intention to take the country toward a military dictatorship and desired to reinstall 
democracy in Turkey. Although it does not justify the military coup, whether a 
democratic constitution could be achieved in a different way cannot be known. On the 
other side of the coin, there were executive and legislative privileges of the military. The 
second side proved that the military desired to overlook the implementation of the 
constitution it had arranged and continued to guard the Republic and Kemalist values 
against undemocratic or extremist governments. These privileges, such as the life-long 
 77 
legislative immunities of the NUC members which came with their status as senators, 
were major guarantees for military-rooted ex officio members (formerly NUC members) 
in exchange for the cession of power to civilians. 
The notion that the military is the most able institution to protect the state from 
internal and external foes is a result of centuries-long events. Having had combatant roots 
and lived in a geostrategic hotspot, Turks have to feed a large army to survive. Also, 
conquests to spread Islam to other parts of the world and a desire to protect the East from 
European invasions forced the Ottoman Empire to be always militarily strong. While 
increasing the importance of the military for the continuity of the state, these factors 
created the notion that the military is the only and most effective institution to protect the 
state from internal and external foes. 
Two problems emerged after the election of 1961. The first problem was some 
groups’ desire to intervene in politics again. As promised in the communiqué on the 
morning of May 27, 1960, democracy was reestablished in the country in a short period 
of time. However, once intervening in politics, some groups in the military could not 
extricate themselves from politics and this affected civil-military relations deeply. These 
groups attempted to intervene in politics at other times—in 1961 and 1962. However, the 
policy followed by Prime Minister Ismet Inonu and the Chief of General Staff averted the 
success of these attempts. These two events clearly displayed the TAF’s sensitivity to 
pursuing and consolidating democracy in Turkey. The second problem was the 
continuing instability in the country. Although the coup was carried out to end instability 
and unconstitutionality of the government in Turkey, the instability continued due to the 
system founded by the 1961 Constitution. Liberties and freedoms guaranteed by the 1961 
Constitution and the proportional representation in the Assembly enabled new parties, 
such as the TLP, to emerge and created ineffective coalition governments. As a result of 
this, ideological conflicts started, and the students and workers spilled into the streets to 
demonstrate for a leftist ideology. Coming from republican roots, the RPP, the JP, and the 
TAF would not let the leftist ideology threaten the Republic and Kemalist values of the 
state. Together with the economic crisis, these events led Turkey to the coup by 
memorandum of 1971 and the military coup of 1980. 
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The decade from 1950 to 1960 under the DP’s rule started a chain reaction. 
Against the unconstitutional and repressive measures used by the Democrats, the TAF 
felt its responsibility as the guardian of the state and seized power in Turkey. A non-
democratic action, the military coup, brought about the creation of the most democratic 
constitution in the history of Turkish Republic: the 1961 Constitution. Also, instead of 
building a repressive military dictatorship, the TAF chose to hand the power back to 
civilians and implement a transition back to democracy in a short period of time. Once 
involved in politics, however, the TAF could not extricate itself from politics, and this 
phenomenon continued until the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
In his book The soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington considers 
professionalism of the armed forces as the decisive factor that keeps the soldier out of 
politics. He argues that professionalism consists of three parts: “expertise, responsibility, 
corporateness.”161 For him, the professional character of the armies has emerged recently 
and must be promoted to separate the military from politics. “Only if they are motivated 
by military ideals will the armed forces be the obedient servants of the state and will 
civilian control be assured.”162 However, in countries such as Germany, Japan, Italy, 
Turkey, and Argentina, highly professional officer corps intervened in politics. In all 
fairness, Turkey’s level of political culture was immature during the 1950s and 1960s. 
So, the absence of a military intervention in a particular country is a result of level of 
democracy more than the level professionalism of the military. That is why, countries 
such as the North American and some Western European countries have never 
experienced military interventions, although they have possessed professional armies. It 
is important to mention that although German and Japan fit into full democracies, this 
was not the case before and during the Second World War. 
“Motivated by military ideals,”163 Turkey’s case fits well into Samuel E. Finer’s 
argument that professionalism “in fact often thrusts the military into collision with the 
161 Huntington, Soldier and State, 8–10. 
162 Ibid., 74. 
163 Ibid. 
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civil authorities.”164 The reason behind this was the TAF’s loyalty to the state, not to the 
government. Through history, the Turkish army has always been considered as the 
guardian of the state, this reached its peak during the Turkish War of Independence. In all 
the military interventions in Turkey, the TAF “contrasted the national community as a 
continuing corporation with the temporary incumbents of office.”165 
To better understand the disposition of the TAF to intervene in politics during the 
1960s, the motives that dispose the military to intervene must be analyzed. Similar to the 
communique announced on May 27, the 1937 speech of António de Oliveira Salazar (the 
prime minister of Portugal from 1932 to 1968) constitutes a good example in 
understanding one of the reasons of the military’s disposition to intervene in politics in 
many countries: 
It will not offend anyone to recognize that the material and moral disasters 
of the last decades brought the decay of the Portuguese nation to its final 
term. In politics, in administration, in the public and the private sectors of 
the economy, the same spectacle of permanent disorder was displayed, 
with its natural consequence in the collapse of the prestige of the state at 
home and overseas… 
In such circumstances, with all the forces of society disorganized and in 
peril of  dissolution, the chief problem was to find the fulcrum for the 
reaction of redemption… 
The army, neglected in the intemperate climate of recent years—wars, 
revolutions, and reforms—is not, despite all, what we would like to be; by 
the very nature of its peculiar constitution, it lives apart from politics, 
subjected to a hierarchy and discipline, serene and firm as a guarantee of 
public order and national security. This very superiority and discipline, 
existing in a body organized in the name of honor and the destiny of the 
country was the sole factor capable of surmounting, with the minimum of 
dislocation and danger, the obstacles created by the empty rigmaroles then 
in being; and to support the New Authority, pledged to work for the 
salvation and resurgence of the country.166 
164 Finer, Man on Horseback, 25. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Quoted in Finer, Man on Horseback, 32–33. 
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Salazar’s words display the reasoning behind the 1961 military coup, the abortive 
coups of 1962 and 1963, the coup by memorandum of 1971, and the 1980 military coup. 
The notion of superiority over civilians (or politicians) was always somewhere in the 
minds of perpetrators of the coups or the coup attempts. This notion, which affected civil-
military relations in Turkey until the beginning of the twenty first century, can be best 
summarized as: “The military knows the better.” 
In conclusion, the TAF’s professionalism and the notion of superiority brought 
about the military intervention and constituted the justification for these interventions. 
However, neither the intervention nor the things done during the military regimes created 
stability in the country. The stability could flourish under consolidated democracies, as in 
the case of North American and some Western European countries. 
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